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ABSTRACT 
The  purpose  of this  discussion  paper  is  to  consider  consumption  insurance  and  its 
various channels at the level of  the individual and at the level of  the economy as a whole 
in  the  context  of the  European  Monetary  Union.  First  we  introduce  a  theoretical 
framework to derive implications of international  risksharing  and  review the empirical 
work on the subject. We conclude that the efficient pooling of consumption risks is not 
the feature of real world.  Second, we discuss of potential market imperfections and the 
extent to which the current market structure can offer consumption insurance.  Finally, 
we  discuss  relevant  policy  implications  of  incomplete  insurance  market.  Two 
arrangements  are  under  consideration:  fiscal  federalism  from  the  point  of view  of 
insurance arrangement and a proposition for opening new risksharing markets. 
Keywords:  Consumption  insurance,  capital  markets,  labor  mobility,  labor  contracts, 
fiscal federalism, financial innovations. 
TDVISTELMA 
Taman  keskustelualoitteen  tarkoituksena  on  esitella  kulutusvakuutusta  yksiloiden  ja 
koko  talouden  taso11a  Euroopan  talous- ja  rahaliiton  kontekstissa.  Ensimmaiseksi 
tutkimuksessa  esitellaan  kulutusvakuutuksen  teoreettinen  kehikko  ja  kaydaan  lapi 
empiirista  kiIjallisuutta.  Kulutusriskien  tehokas  jakaminen  ei  ole  reaalimaailman 
ominaisuus.  Toiseksi  keskustellaan  mahdollisista  markkinaepataydellisyyksista  ja 
mahdollisuuksista jakaa riskeja nykyisilla markkinoilla.  Lopuksi esitellaan epataydellisen 
vakuutusmarkkinan  politiikkasuosituksia,  joina  tarkastellaan  fiskaalisen  federalismin 
kulutusvakuutusominaisuuksia seka uusia riskinjakomarkkinoita. 
Asiasanat:  Kulutusvakuutus,  paaomamarkkinat,  tyovoiman  liikkuvuus, 
palkkasopimukset, fiskaalinen federalismi, rahoitusinnovaatiot  . 
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This study is about consumption insurance, at the level of the individual, or at least 
the household  and  at  the level of the economy  as a whole,  in  the context  of the 
European Monetary Union. The study describes research and a recent literature on 
financial markets, institutional arrangements, and agent-specific behavior that can be 
used for insurance purposes, and finally draws conclusions about policy implications 
of incomplete insurance markets. But before moving on to details some theoretical 
foundations and concepts are introduced. 
The idea that  economic units  attempt to insure their  consumption stream  against 
individual income or wealth fluctuations is one of the most attractive and challenging 
feature  of  modern  macroeconomics.  The  appropriate  frameworks  for  analyzing 
consumption behavior of economic units under uncertainty  are life-cycle model  of 
Modigliani and  Brumberg  (1954)  and  the  permanent  income model  of Friedman 
(1957). 
The basic idea behind life-cycle model applies the ideas of intertemporal allocation to 
explain the way in which the consumption evolves with age over the life-span of the 
unit  (in this  case individual, or household).  In turn,  in permanent  income model 
consumption  is determined  by  permanent income,  typically defined  as average  or 
expected future labor income. 
However,  these models can not be seen as distinct - each of these approaches is 
based on explicit utility maximization of an individual economic unit subject to the 
constraints that the unit faces. The important point shared by these theories is that 
units form their consumption decisions on the basis of their lifetime income rather 
than simply their current income as in the Keynesian consumption function. Optimal 
consumption behavior requires units to forecast their future incomes. Therefore, in 
responding to a change in consumption possibilities, units must forecast the future 
course  of incomes  as well  as the current  income.  Because,  there  is uncertainty 
concerning the consumption possibilities in future, or in other words future incomes 
are, indeed, not perfectly predictable,  there is a demand by  a risk-averse units for 
insurance.  Indeed,  in  the  absence  of uncertainty  or  actually  in  the presence  of 
complete insurance  arrangements there is no reason for consumption of economic 
unit  to track  income. In particular,  the response  of individual economic units to 
various  changes  in  consumption  possibilities  depends  on the  nature  of available 
insurance arrangements. 
Then how does consumption of a completely insured  (i.e. under  fully functioning 
insurance  markets)  economic  unit  behaves?  There  are  many  common  features 
between the theory of complete consumption insurance and theories of early social 
philosophers. According to the theory of risksharing if risks are largely idiosyncratic 
or transitory,  then  risk-averse  economic units  should  group together to pool the 
risks. Under perfect risksharing,  the consumption growth of a representative  unit 
(country) should track aggregate (global) consumption growth, and nothing else. In other words, movements in average group consumption represent aggregate risk but 
all other shocks are pooled efficiently through the risksharing mechanism. 
What then is meant by  insurance? The idealistic socialists described that  'complete 
consumption insurance'  would be possible if there were a new community spirit in 
society and if there were communities where incomes were pooled. However, the 
question here is to try to achieve optimal allocation of risks on a voluntary and self- 
interested  basis:  A  broad  definition  of  insurance  will  be  used  in  discussing  the 
importance of different arrangements. For purposes of this study, insurance will be 
defined  as any  state-contingent  arrangement that  allows units  to mitigate  random 
fluctuations in marginal utility. Indeed, this definition is deliberately general in order 
to convey the view that insights about insurance can be applied to the problems that 
at first sight seem to have nothing to do with insurance. 
Full consumption insurance can be obtained theoretically when financial markets are 
complete or when there is a set of institutions which allow units to achieve optimal 
allocations.  It  can  be  stated  that  perfect  consumption  insurance,  which  allow 
representative units  to diversify idiosyncratic  risk  completely,  can be  achieved  by 
writing  perfect  state  contingent  contracts.  At  an  abstract  level  these  contracts 
correspond to the Arrow-Debreu  notion of state contingent  claims. With complete 
markets agents are able to trade as many independent assets as there are prospective 
states of nature.  The result  of this trade is that  agents  everywhere  in  the world 
equalize their marginal rates  of substitution of present  for future state-contingent 
consumption. 
6 
t  The development of asset markets is a notable feature of modern private ownership 
I  economies. Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) extended the economic analysis from 
i  static world  to stochastic one by  introducing  a  market  structure consisting  of a 
i 
; 
system of contingent contracts: for each good and for each date-event  in the future 
I  there is a contract which promises to deliver one unit of consumption of a specified 
I 
good at given date and  given  of the state of the world.'  The price  of the state- 
I  contingent claim is determined in competitive markets. Thus the insurance via state 
I  contingent claim permits the insured agent to exchange consumption (income) in one 
I 
I  state for consumption in other. And actually each unit is then able to make her life- 
I 
I  cycle consumption plan at the beginning of life. This 'master-plan'  consists of a set 
1 
of contingency plans, each detailing what consumption will be in each possible state 
of the world. With complete Arrow-Debreu  securities such plans can be efficiently 
I 
I  implemented,  because  consumption  in  various  states  of  the  world  will  exactly 
I 
I  correspond to the initial contingency plan. 
I 
In the name of justice it can be claimed that each individual should be able to insure 
herself against each adverse shock that is beyond one's control. However, in practice 
'  Following assumptions must be made considering the full information condition: i) All decision 
taking agents have in their minds the same sets of states of the world, ii) When period t+  I arrives, 
all agents will be able to recognize which state of the world prevails and agree on it, iii) At period t, 
each agent is able to assign a probability to the event that a particular state of the world will occur 
at period t+  1;  these probabilities may differ for different agents, but all the probability assignments 
satisfy the basic probability laws. most of the shocks to agents consumption possibilities are not insurable because of 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, which prevent  such diversification 
of human-capital  portfolio.  In addition,  even if moral hazard and adverse selection 
are absent an efficient insurance for private economic units against adverse shocks 
may, however, not be feasible. In general terms used here this is due to problems of 
verifling which state of the world prevails, and the to problem of lacking knowledge 
of  probabilities  among  purchasers  of  insurance.  Obviously,  these  informational 
handicaps create a problem for writers of insurance policies. 
The following  assumption  is made  in  order to outline  the proceeding  discussion 
easier: An  economy can be described in very general and abstract terms as system 
within which natural resources and the services of capital are combined with human 
labor to produce consumer goods. Natural resources and capital goods are combined 
under  the  single  heading  -  capital.  There  are three  representative  agents within 
individual  economy:  namely  capitalist,  worker  and  government.  Government  is 
supposed  to  maximize  a  social-welfare  function  by  distributing  consumption 
possibilities  available on  each  date,  and  in  each  state among  the  citizens  of the 
country. A direct distinction between the individual citizens of the country and the 
government  is not  made.  This  assumption  allows to discuss  risksharing  between 
countries,  and  yet,  on the  other  hand  it  is  possible  to keep  in  mind  risksharing 
possibilities of an individual agent. 
1.1 Structure of the Study 
The objective of this study is to consider arrangements, which provide risksharing in 
real economies. More or less implicitly, then,  an attempt is made to challenge the 
complete risksharing model as a description of these real world arrangements. The 
rest of the study is organized as follows. 
Chapter  2  will  introduce  a  theoretical  framework  to  derive  implications  of 
international risksharing for consumption behavior at the global and local (country) 
level. If world consumption risks are efficiently pooled  then the consumption of a 
representative unit should not respond to idiosyncratic income or wealth shocks and 
the growth of the discounted  marginal utility  of consumption is equalized  across 
units.  These implications  of efficient risksharing  could  be  subjected  to empirical 
testing.  Although  the  arrangements  of  complete  consumption  insurance  are 
theoretically  very  simple,  empirical  research  suggests  that  the  international 
risksharing  is  hardly  a  feature  of the real  world.  In  section  2  a  review  of this 
empirical research is made. It is found that international consumption correlations 
are lower than the theory predicts. 
These  observed  international  consumption  patterns  leads  to  discuss  of potential 
market imperfections and channels of risksharing. In chapter 3 the focus will be on 
the  existing  financial  institutions  alone.  It  is  oRen  stated  that  if  international 
risksharing occurs capital should be mobile, financial portfolios should be diversified, 
credit markets should work efficiently, and saving-investment correlations should be 
low. Section 1 analyses capital mobility, which is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for economic units to trade their differential consumption risks. It is found out that 
capital is mobile at least in short-run. Yet, the unexplained puzzle is why risktrading 
does  not  occur?  Section  2  discusses  portfolio  compositions  among  industrial 
countries.  Evidence  against  complete  risksharing  is  found  -  the  portfolio  of 
developed countries are often composed  largely of domestic assets. One problem 
here is that most individuals are liquidity constrained and financial wealth is largely 
invested  in  region-specific  real  estate. Moreover  today's  stock  markets  facilitate 
direct  hedging  of only  a  small  part  of the risks  associated  with  national  income 
fluctuations  (i.e. corporate earnings). Capital markets are, then,  incomplete in the 
sense that most private agents are unable to hedge against adverse shocks. This fact 
may be used to argue in favor of government intervention in this framework. 
Although there is no central fiscal institution at the EU level, there already exists a 
country-specific  insurance  system  that  works  as  an  automatic  consumption 
smoother:  namely  the  market  mechanism  of  world  credit  markets.  If  there  are 
complete markets for credit, then income shocks can be smoothed out by borrowing 
and  saving and,  hence,  transitory  shocks  should  not  affect  consumption patterns. 
However,  when  credit  markets  are  incomplete countries  are  constrained  in  their 
ability  to  obtain  credit,  and,  hence  unable  to  smooth  consumption.  Section  3 
discusses  credit  market  imperfections.  Finally  section  4  summarizes  the  capital 
market  imperfections  and focuses on measures of the economic integration of real 
activity from the perspective of saving-investment correlations. It is concluded that 
there is small net flow of capital across countries and limited extent of intertemporal 
trade between countries. 
Chapter 4 discusses agent-specific self-insurance arrangements, which might occur 
both at the level of individual country or at the level of industry. Especially, workers 
should  be  able to insure themselves  against  agent-specific  shocks by  diversifying 
their human capital portfolios via efficient labor contracts. However, it  seems that 
the these contracts are not a feature of the real world. In addition, labor mobility is 
discussed in the second section. If the labor force were extremely mobile differences 
in gross national products would not last for long. However, it is realistic to assume 
that migration will occur only under asymmetric and permanent disturbances. 
i 
i  Chapter 5 discusses relevant policy implications of incomplete insurance market. It 
investigates possibilities to construct a European institution or markets, which could 
I  induce  Pareto  improvement  risk  allocation.  The  non-existent  private  insurance 
1  market  and,  on the  other  hand  limited  ability  of the  member  countries  of the 
I 
monetary  union  to smooth consumption under  certain  conditions  makes  it  more 
essential  to  develop  political  and  economical  insurance  institutions  that  sustain 
1  smooth operation of the economies. In the first section of this chapter the focus is on 
fiscal federalism. A popular explanation for the tolerance of region-specific shocks of 
an individual member country in the monetary union is that the federal fiscal system 
provides regional insurance. Benefits and drawbacks of federal fiscal policy from the 
point  of view  of insurance  arrangement  are  discussed.  Section 2 then  discusses propositions  for  opening  new  financial  markets  or  constructing  new  risksharing 
mechanism. Also some notes on the new roles of old institutions are presented. 
Chapter 6 concludes. 
2 THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RISKSHARING 
There is no  case for  public intervention if  all  economic units  are  able to insure 
themselves  against  asymmetric  adverse  shocks  and  thus  avoid  a  comparatively 
paihl  real income adjustment. Complete insurance implies that the consumption of 
individual economic units (i.e. agents, families, co~ntries)~  should not vary over time 
in response to idiosyncratic shocks, while the permanent income hypothesis implies 
that the consumption of an individual economic unit  should not  vary over time in 
response to transitory shocks (Canova and Ravn, 1994). The principal implication of 
risksharing is that  individual  consumption responds  to  symmetric shocks  (that  is 
aggregate  consumption movements) but  not  asymmetric ones (e.g. movements in 
individuals' income). Some possible sources of such insurance scheme are stocks and 
securities markets,  borrowing  and  lending  in  credit  markets,  contracts  between 
employer and employee and so on. With such a complete insurance system there is 
no need for any public intervention. 
2.1 Model of Complete Consumption Insurance on Microfoundations 
If markets are complete (or if there is some other mechanism or set of institutions) 
that implement a full-information Pareto optimal allocation, then the consumption of 
individual should not respond to idiosyncratic income or wealth shocks (Cochrane, 
199  1). Thus the full insurance model can be seen as an extreme version of PM.  Next 
a  general  version  of  full  risksharing  model  in  full  information  environment  is 
analyzed. More  detailed  derivation  of model  is  presented  for  example  in  Mace 
(1 99 1). 
A full insurance Pareto optimal consumption allocation maximizes the discounted 
weighted sum of individual units utility functions denoted by U 
where @(a  is consumption by unit j at time t when state of the world is f,  2  is the 
Pareto weight of unit j, which reflects the initial distribution of wealth; (dl' is the 
discount  factor  of unit j  at time  t; Ns')  is the probability of state S;  and  B(s') 
represents  all  those  factors  other  than  consumption  which  affect  the  utility  of 
economic unit. Feasibility constraint requires that aggregate consumption must be 
less than or equal to the aggregate endowment at each date and in each state of the 
world: 
-- 
For the purposes of this study the most interesting economic unit is indeed an individual country. J  J 
(2)  cA  (st)  = C  C)  (st)  5 C  el (s')  I  e  A (st)  , for all Sf 
)=I  )=I 
where d(9)  is endowment of economic unit j  at time t and eA(S) is total amount of 
the consumption good available at time f; 
The first-order conditions for Pareto optimal consumption allocations are 
(p~)'~~d~y)[~(~t),  ~J(s')]  = p(st), for all sand  j = I,  ...,  J, 
where p(f) equals Lagrange multiplier associated with feasibility constraint, divided 
by the probability of state Sb. The set of first-order  conditions given by (3) embody 
the implications of hll insurance for consumption patterns across individual units, 
time periods and states of nature. Full insurance implies identical growth rates across 
units in the marginal utility of consumption. This can be seen by loolung at multiplier 
p(f),  which varies with aggregate  consumption  but  is constant  across units for a 
particular state and date. Hence given aggregate consumption  and Pareto weights, 
the consumption of individual unit do not vary with their endowments. Second, since 
the Pareto weights are time invariant, it is possible to use observations at two point 
in time to remove the unit fixed effects: 
which states that the growth between t and t+l in the discounted marginal utility of 
consumption is same for all units. 
However, the linear property  of Arrow-Debreu  economies of perfectly  correlated 
consumption  prevails only if preferences are identical, homothetic  and  additively- 
separable. 
2.2 Evidence Against Full Risksharing 
Although the concept of consumption insurance is theoretically  quite simple, it has 
been  the focus of empirical research  only  for  a  short  time.  However,  to derive 
observable implications from the basic theory some strong assumptions on national 
utility hnctions (on preferences3, time and state separability for example)  must be 
imposed. Empirical research suggests that international  consumption risksharing is 
hardly  a  feature of the real  world.  It is  claimed that  aggregate  consumption  of 
Only if preferences are identical, homothetic and separable will consumptions of two separate 
units will be perfectly correlated. Thus, under theory measured consumption growth can vary across 
units for only three reasons: (1) Utility functions differ across units, (2) units experience 
idiosyncratic preference shocks and (3) observed unit consumption contains idiosyncratic 
measurement error. individual countries does react to country specific shocks. Insurance market seems to 
be  imperfect  or  at  least  partially  inaccessible  for  some  agents  or  there  are  no 
institutions implementing the first best solution. Next a review of empirical research, 
both on macro- and microdata, is made. 
2.2.1 Evidence on Macrodata 
In  the  empirical  work  of  consumption  insurance  studied  in  this  section  utility 
hnctions are specified with isoelastic preferences: First it is studied utility function in 
which variables are internationally tradeable. Second, non-tradeables are added in to 
utility  function,  and  finally  it  is  assumed  that  tradeables  and  non-tradeables  are 
separable. 
Obstfeld (1995) examined the correlation coefficients for changes in the logaritmics 
of annual per capita real private consumption growth rates (denoted by  2:  ) with the 
rest of the world per capita private consumption growth rates (denoted by  2tw)4  over 
two periods:  195  1 to 1972 and from 1973 to 1988. To test empirically theoretical 
implications of complete consumption insurance with international consumption data 
he specified utility function with  isoelastic preferences for each country j  (it  was 
assumed that no non-tradeables x' were consumed): 
where  R,  is  the  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion  of  country j.5 Then  if 
2,  = log  c, -  log c,-,  then the equation (4) implies 
That is logarithmic growth rates of consumption are perfectly correlated ex post  in 
all countries. It is assumed that all countries have same rates of time preferences so 
there is no constant term. Estimated log-difference regression was: 
where disturbance, &jt  is assumed to follow a stationary process. 
4 Looking at correlations with world consumption growth, rather than pairwise consumption 
growth has some statistical advantages. According to Obstfeld (1994) there is no problem of an 
endogenous-regressor that is world consumption can be stated to be independent variable in 
explaining the consumption of country j, even in the presence of significant country-specific 
preference shocks. 
Although CRRA specification was adopted, any member of the HARA utility functions would 
serve the purposes of the empirical research (see e.g. Breman and Solnik, 1989). It was found that all the correlation coefficients are well below the value of  1. For 
the  narrow  majority  of  EU member  countries,  domestic and  world  consumption 
growth  rates  are  relatively  strongly  correlated  (in  post  1973 period  correlation 
coefficient for Belgium is  0.49, for Denmark 0.60, for France 0.50, for Germany 
0.72, for  Ireland  0.48, for Netherlands  0.56 and  for the  United  Kingdom  0.59). 
Countries that still hold capital controls (Greece, Portugal and Spain) as well as Italy 
which  did  so  through  early  1990  are  in  minority:  correlations  with  world 
consumption growth rates are 0.13, 0.06, 0.32 and 0.27, respectively. Correlations 
for the new member countries Austria, Finland and  Sweden seem to be low: 0.29, 
0.19 and 0.18, respectively in post  1973 period - all of these countries hold  capital 
controls through 1980. For almost all the EU countries the correlation coefficients 
rises between the sub-periods, most dramatically for Germany from -0.11 to 0.72. 
The  rise  of  correlations  is  not  necessarily  due  to  international  asset  market 
integration, but  merely the result of common shocks to the world  macroeconomy 
that hit  all the industrialized economies simultaneously and with similar effects on 
consumption growth. Leading source of such shocks in the post 1973 period was the 
real price of the petroleum. However, multiple regressions proved that this last result 
hold even when OPEC oil-price shocks were controlled6 (although the oil variable 
entered significantly in the regressions for Italy, the UK  and the US suggesting that 
these countries did not fblly trade to the rest of the world sample the idiosyncratic 
consumption risk due to oil-price changes). 
However,  Obstfeld  reported that  for industrial countries outside the EU there  is 
tendency that the consumption correlations are lower in the recent period except for 
Japan and Switzerland. One could argue these countries adopted greater exchange 
rate flexibility than EU countries in the early 1970s because they desired to decouple 
their consumption growth from world consumption growth. However, the Japanese 
example show that these is not necessarily the case. 
Obstfeld (1994) studied whether the change in consumption growth rates are more 
closely correlated with domestic or foreign factors by  the following regression: 
where y' is real per capita GDP of country j; ind' is real per capita investment; g'  is 
real per capita government spending, and  k is a linear  combination of preference 
shocks. The quantity Tr' r  d' - (y' -2nd' -g')  measures the net resource transfers from 
the rest of the world to country j  due to foreign borrowing, interest and  dividend 
earnings and  capital gains  on  assets held  abroad  plus  all  other  state-contingent 
payments on foreign wealth. Thus if the international asset market is absent domestic 
per  capita consumption 2  is limited to y' - inv" - g' and  the  specified  regression, 
The oil-price shocks were controlled using regression:  2:  = a,  + a,?: + a,  AOIL, + &,,  , 
where  AOIL, is the change in the log real oil price between years t and t-1. indeed,  indicates whether  consumption growth  is  more  strongly  associated  with 
global or domestic  factor^.^ 
The regressions indicated that all a2  coefficients were insignificantly different from  1 
and financial markets did  not provide  consumption insurance for the years  1951- 
1972. For the years  1973-1988 results where quite different. For France, Germany, 
Italy  and  Japan  hypothesis that  a,  =1  and  a2=0  can  not  be  rejected.  Germany 
showed the  most  strongest characteristics of  an  economy  that  is  well  integrated 
world financial markets: a, = 1.07 (with standard error 0.32) and  a2  = 0.02 (with 
standard error 0.20). 
Obstfeld  (1995)  reported  also  correlations  between  national  per  capita  output 
growth  rates  and  the  rest  of  the  world  per  capita  output  growth.  For  all 
industrialized  countries except  Germany  and  Luxembourg these  correlations rise 
between  the  two  sub-periods.  This  indeed  involves  fbndamental  identification 
problem  from  risksharing  perspective: any  increase  over  time  in  the  correlation 
between national and world consumption growth could be  due to either increased 
risksharing mechanism or because of exogenous shifts in output correlations rather 
than improved risksharing. 
According to life-cycle theory, consumption depends on lifetime resources, not on 
current output  or income. However, another alternative explanation for increased 
consumption growth correlations is  a  simple  Keynesian  consumption  function in 
which  consumption  merely  tracks  current  output.  Or  richer  models  such  as 
suggested by  Carroll and Summers (1991), which builds on the evidence against life- 
cycle interpretation of cross-country relationship between growth and  saving that 
comes  from  cross-country  comparisons  of  cross-sections  of  consumption  and 
in~ome.~  The results of Obstfeld (1995) proved that correlations between domestic 
output and  consumption growth are high in most cases and  the correlations have 
actually tendency to increase over time, although they often are well below unity. 
In  order  to resolve  this  problem  Obstfeld  (1994)  estimated  following  equation 
country-by-country  : 
where GDP,"  is world per capita outside country  j. Estimates suggested that for G-7 
countries other than Italy and the US, it was world consumption growth rather than 
world output growth that was more closely related to domestic consumption in the 
'  The regression in this framework is closely related to one developed by Feldstein and Horioka 
(1 980) for estimation of the cross-sectional correlation between domestic saving and investment 
(see 3.4 for more detailed analysis). 
8 Carroll and Summers calculated age consumption profiles for the US, Canada, the UK,  Denmark, 
Norway and Japan. In spite of differences in growth experiences, the profiles were quite similar 
from one country to another. For the US and Japan growth rates of real per capita GDP from 1960 
to 1985 have been 2.1% @a) and 5.2% @a) respectively. In spite of this, the Japanese consumption 
age-profile, although quite similar to the US, actually peaked slightly later, in contradiction to the 
theoretical prediction. post  1973 era. For France,  Germany  and  Japan  the  reverse of  this relationship 
between  the  two  sample periods was  true.  Tests  suggest that  for  example high 
correlation of Japanese with world  consumption growth may  reflect only the high 
correlation coefficient  between  world  consumption and  Japanese output,  coupled 
with  the  high  correlation of  Japanese  output  and  consumption.  German  output 
growth also has very high correlation coefficient with world consumption growth, 
yet  adds no  significant  explanatory  power  to  a regression of  German  on  world 
consumption growth. These regressions were somewhat analogous to those reported 
by  Campbell  and  Mankiw  (1991) who  examined  departures from  the  permanent 
income hypothesis. 
Campbell  and  Mankiw  found  that  aggregate consumption responds  not  just  to 
changes in permanent income but also to changes in current income. They measured 
the effect of current income on consumption  by  a coefficient A,  which was scaled to 
zero if all agents consumed their permanent income and one if all agents consumed 
their current income. Using quarterly data from the US, the UK, Canada, Japan and 
Sweden  they  found  that  variables  that  predict  income  growth  predict  also 
consumption  growth.  In  Japan  it  was  found  that  neither  income  growth  nor 
consumption growth are predictable (A  was unidentified). In other countries they 
found that predictable income growth and predictable consumption growth moved in 
proportion with one another. The estimates of A ranged from 0.2 (Canada) to nearly 
1.0 (France),  Sweden,  the  US  and  the  UK  were  between  these  two  extremes. 
Countries with better developed credit markets seemed to have lower values of A. 
However, authors found no evidence that the coefficient A had  declined during the 
sample period, which indeed is at odds with financial deregulation and  innovation. 
Possibly,  other  factors  have  worked  efficiently to  offset  the  effects of  financial 
deregulation. 
One should, however, keep in mind  the strong assumptions that were imposed (for 
example that non-tradeables are not consumed) on the econometric specification of 
Obstfeld  (1995)  before  drawing  any  firm  conclusions  of  the  efficiency  of 
international risksharing. 
If some non-tradeables are consumed, national consumptions need not be perfectly 
correlated: risks relating to the consumption of non-traded goods may be impossible 
to  share  (Stockman and  Dellas,  1989). At  best,  consumption  of  tradeables  will 
display  perfectly  correlated  growth  rates  if  the  utility  function  is  separable  in 
tradeables and  non-tradeables. However, Tesar (1 993) argued  that  if variables  in 
utility function that are internationally tradeable are not separable from those that are 
non-tradeable, then the correlations of aggregate consumption growth rates weaker 
than perfect will prevail despite complete markets. 
Several studies have attempted to submit  consumption correlations with complete 
markets and perfect capital mobility by  investing stochastic effects of a labor and 
leisure trade-off as well as tradeables and non-tradeables trade-off. Backus, Kehoe and  Kydland  (1992) reported output fluctuations between the US 
and  12 developed countries as well  as cross-country consumption correlations. The 
output correlations varied in size, but were positive for all countries except for South 
Africa. The largest correlation was for Canada (0.77), while correlation between the 
US  and European aggregate was 0.70. Cross-country correlations for consumption 
varied also across countries but  were (against real  business cycle models) smaller 
than output correlations. The largest correlation was again for Canada (0.65). The 
consumption correlation between  the US  and  the European  aggregate was  0.46, 
which was substantially smaller than the output correlation. Obstfeld (1  995) reported 
similar results among 23  industrial countries. After  1973 the  correlation between 
national  and  world  consumption growth  rate  exceeded the  one  between  national 
output  growth  rate  and  world  output  growth  rate  only  in  Finland  (0.19, 0.06), 
Denmark  (0.60, 0.39),  Sweden  (0.18,  0.04) and  Switzerland  (0.64,  0.53). The 
largest consumption as well as output correlation was in Germany (0.72, 0.87). 
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) tried to capture these findings by  studying  the 
effects of  technology shocks in calibrated two-country real business cycle model 
with a single homogenous good and internationally immobile labor. 
Utility fbnction takes the form: 
where  O<p<l,  y<1  and  c'  denotes  consumption  of  the  produced  good;  1'  is  a 
distributed lag on leisure. Output in country i was defined: 
where O<8<1, v>-1, o>O and k is capital; n is labor input; z is stock of inventories; 
and l  is technology shock (>O). 
World output from two processes is allocated to consumption, fixed investment and 
inventory  accumulation.  Technology  shock  process  was  specified  for  the  two 
countries as a bivariate autoregression: 
where +(/2:,  A;)  , A is a matrix coefficient; and the innovations, EF(E:,  E:  )  , are 
serially independent, multivariate, normal random variables with contemporaneous 
covariance matrix V, which allow contemporaneous correlation between the home 
(h)  and foreign V) innovations. 
In their theoretical open economy set-up, consumption was more highly  correlated 
across countries, output was less highly  correlated, and investment and the balance 
of trade were much more volatile than data indicated. In order to capture these real 
world  effects,  authors introduced trading frictions into their model.  Consumption correlations still  exceeded  output  correlations,  however,  in  all  their  experiments, 
even in those where trading  frictions were prohibitive  and with  several  parameter 
settings -  cross-country  correlation  of consumption  remained  substantially  larger 
than the output correlation,  which indeed is at  odds with  the data. It  seems that 
consumption  correlations  are  too low to be  explained by  a  model  incorporating 
nonseparable leisure in utility. 
Deveraux, Gregory and Smith (1992) constructed a two-country real business cycle 
model  in  which  preferences  are  not  separable  between  consumption  and  labor 
supply, labor is internationally immobile and two countries share identical production 
technologies  with  100  per  cent  depreciation  (Cobb-Douglas  form)  but  each 
technique is subjected to an independent,  country-specific, productivity  shock. The 
model generates correlations between national consumption rates, which are close to 
those observed in the US-Canada  data. However, their model did not address other 
shortcomings of business cycle models. 
Lewis  (1996)  carried  out a panel  study of the growth  of non-durable,  tradeable 
consumption, using datag from 48 countries sampled at five-year intervals from 1970 
to 1985 in order to examine the importance of non-separabilities between tradeables 
and non-tradeables of non-durables in risksharing. The utility fbnction was specified: 
where P is tradeable consumption in country  j; N  is non-tradeable consumption; L'  is 
leisure in country j; d is country-specific shock to preferences that is uninsurable at 
time 0; and ry(T,N) is a linearly homogenous aggregator fbnction. 
Tested regression was form of 
where t~  E  log  7;j -  log Til ; Bo(fl  is a constant at time t; 01 = (mj' - yl / (5,"  + 
(yXT /  I- XT)) and where 6rn-l is the elasticity of substitution between tradeables and 
non-tradeables,  y is the parameter  of relative  risk  aversion, XT is the expenditure 
share on tradeables;  = c& and where c+yXT  + (I- Xd / &)-I  and am  is the 
elasticity of marginal utility of the tradeables and non-tradeables. Movements in X: 
are insurable so if risksharing occurs one should find that P=O. 
Lewis started her analysis by assuming that all goods are tradeable and non-durable, 
i.e. y(T,N)=T. Therefore econometric specification can be written 
9 Penn World Tables data set version 5.6  was used. Description of data can be found in Summers 
and Heston (1991) X:  is  deviation  of  domestic  output  from  the  global  average  in  each  period  t. 
Following results were obtained with  pooled  time-series  cross-section  regressions 
correcting the standard  errors for conditional heteroskedasticity when  considering 
non-separabilities:  The  percent  of  cross-sectional  consumption  variation  that  is 
explained by  leisure was small indeed, less than one tenth of a percent. However, 
under  consumption-leisure  separability, idiosyncratic variations in  output explained 
about 57% of the variation in  idiosyncratic consumption movements.  So domestic 
output is a strong and significant determinant of total consumption growth. 
To test risksharing by using disaggregated data following modification was used: 
This equation, where leisure is treated  as separable, results by  setting 82  equal to 
zero in the original equation. The evidence on risksharing was similar to the case of 
consumption  aggregates.  However,  when  tradeables  and  non-tradeables  were 
assumed  separable  the  consumption  of  non-durable  tradeable  was  significantly 
related  to  the  domestic  output  of  tradeables.  Furthermore,  the  percentage  of 
variation  in  consumption  explained  by  output  is  even  higher  than  that  of  the 
consumption aggregates. When non-tradeables were allowed for the coefficient 
was insignificantly different from zero and the variation in non-tradeables  explained 
only 0.1% of the variation  in tradeables. Since consumption growth of tradeables 
was  significantly  correlated  with  domestic  output  growth,  the  evidence  rejected 
risksharing. To summarize Lewis (1 996) the consumption of non-durable tradeables 
is significantly related to output, the explanatory power  of non-separabilities  does 
not  appear to be  high. However,  Lewis did  not  look at  idiosyncratic  sources on 
consumption variability other than income growth so her results do not fully explain 
why consumption correlations remained low even after attention is restricted to non- 
durable  tradeables.  In  addition,  panel  methodology  used  may  contain  large 
measurement errors. 
It seems that equilibrium complete market models with perfect  capital mobility can 
not provide a satisfactory explanation of the observed low international consumption 
correlations  not  even  after  accounting  for  tradeables  and  non-tradeables  in  the 
models. However,  unobserved  preference  shocks may  contain  useful  explanatory 
power. Yet, most of the modeling work still remains to be done, so at this point it is 
not possible to judge whether these extensions are useful. 
Canova  and  Ravn  (1994)  allowed  for  preference  shocks  in  their  formal  test  of 
consumption  risksharing  models.  In  tests  using  quarterly  data  from  nine  OECD 
countries they found that domestic consumption seems to be well insured  against 
domestic  shocks  which  are  cyclical  in  nature  but  that  it  tends  to  covary  with 
demographic  and  labor  market  variables.  They  did,  however,  rejected  long-run 
implications of the model. 
Soerensen  et  al.  (1995)  developed  a  framework  for  quantifjling the  amount  of 
interstate risksharing  achieved via  several  channels in the US.  The basic  idea  of Soerensen  et  al.  is  to  consider  three  institutional  arrangements,  which  provide 
risksharing in the real economy: capital markets, federal tax-transfer system and loan 
markets,  and to estimate the effective amount of risksharing  or smoothing at each 
level. The basis for their empirical analysis comes from the necessary condition of an 
intertemporal maximization program of a representative expected utility maximizing 
citizen of state i  (of the federal  state),  whose  utility  fbnction  is  of the  constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA). This condition can compactly written as 
where GDP  denotes aggregate (federal) gross domestic product and c', the per capita 
amount  of the good available for consumption  in period  t  by  agents in  state i, k' 
captures the  strength  of state i's  claim  to output in risksharing  and  it  in  general 
depends on the state's endowment and degree of relative riskaversion (RRA). In the 
important  case  of log-utility  (RRA=I),  k'  reduces  to state i's  expected  share  in 
present and fbture aggregate output. 
Before specifying the empirical equations the authors discuss the three levels (or 
channels) of smoothing, each giving rise to a different interpretation of the preceding 
equation or, more precisely, the left hand side variable of equation. At the first level 
risks  in  (state  specific)  consumption  possibilities  could  be  hedged  via  securities 
(capital) markets, so that in the case of full risksharing (i.e. complete markets) each 
state would  consume  its  pre  federal  state  incomelo, pfsi',  defined  as  resources 
available for consumption by the residents of state i if no fiscal intervention by  the 
federal government occurs. Under less than complete securities markets, there is a 
risksharing role for the federal  tax-transfer  system.  In the event  that this  system 
completes securities, thus resulting in full risksharing, then fully hedged consumption 
i  resources at the state level consists of the sum of pfsi and federal net transfers, called 
1 
i 
the state income",  si' for short. Finally, loan markets gain a role in  smoothing,  if 
i  capital markets coupled with the federal tax-transfer system do not achieve it fklly. If 
I  loan  markets  sustain  full  risksharing,  the  above  equation  holds  for  state 
I  consumption12,  c'. 
Let  x',  be  a  generic  variable  representing pfsi,  si  or c  depending  which  of the 
channels for smoothing consumption possibilities is under consideration. The authors 
specified estimate deviations from full  risksharing  with  a  panel  regression  of the 
form: 
10 Pre federal state income consists of per capita resources for consumption after dividends, interest 
and rental income have been distributed to securities holders. 
11 State income is defined as per capita resources for consumption after including net transfers from 
the federal government. 
12 State consumption equals the sum of private and state consumption, the latter net of state 
transfers. Hence borrowing and lending on national credit markets has been accounted for this 
measure. where gsp'  denotes the gross national product of  state i and  h is  the fraction of 
distributed profits assumed constant across states i (i.e.  = &). The presence of h 
in the regression equation signifies smoothing via retained profits (a fraction I-hi  of 
gross state product). In order to avoid complications from unit roots and potentially 
spurious regression results, the authors considered time differenced panel regressions 
for each level of smoothing xi: 
A log x:  = v,, +  P,A log gsp: + u:,, , 
where  A  is  the time  difference operator; and  v,,  captures the  time  fixed  effects, 
defined as the time difference of the time specific variables A,  GDP and n (aggregate 
price level). Aggregate price level, n,  enters the equation after deflating the state 
specific  and  aggregate variables  by  the  corresponding  price  indices  (xlt  and  xt 
respectively) and assuming that xit  = nixl. 
Following equation measures smoothing accomplished at each level: 
where G:, is the OLS estimate of the slope in the regression of Alogx - Alogv  on 
Aloggsp. The  first  component  of the  right-hand  side  measures  the  amount  of 
smoothing achieved via capital markets, second the amount achieved by  the federal 
government, third via credit markets, and the fourth coefficient measures the extent 
to which full risksharing has been achieved. 
It was found that 40% of the shocks were smoothed by the capital markets, 14% by 
the federal government, 24 % by credit markets, and 22% are were not smoothed for 
the period 1963-  1990. 
The analysis was repeated for two sub-periods from 1964 to 1978 and from 1979 to 
1990. It was found that capital markets smoothing was 29% in the period 1964-1  978 
and  50%  in  the  latter  period.  Credit  market  smoothing  indicated  large  change 
between two sub-periods: 5 1% for 1964-  1978 and  1  1  % in the second period. The 
amount of smoothing by  the federal government was very stable over time: 12% for 
1964-1978 and  14% for  1979-1990. Increase in  capital market smoothing can be 
explained by  financial innovations and liberalization of capital movements during the 
latter period of analysis. 
Although, there has been  an increase in  smoothing via  capital market  the results 
indicate that 22 percent of a shock to gross state product  remains uninsured. In 
addition  25%  of  an  income  shock  during  the  1979-1990  period  remained 
unsmoothed, whereas the corresponding estimate for the first  subperiod was  8%. 
These findings of less than full risksharing are consistent with other related empirical 
research on the US data. 
However, Obstfeld (1  995) demonstrates that increased international trade in broader 
range of assets has taken place after  1973. Soerensen et  al.  (1995) also provide evidence  on  this  point  within  the  US.  Yet,  the  puzzle  is  why  the  degree  of 
international risksharing still appears to be so low. 
2.2.2 Evidence on Microdata 
An  alternative  approach  is  to  study  whether  consumers  within  communities, 
countries or states respond only to symmetric but not asymmetric ones. 
Mace  (1991)  tested  the  strongest  proposition  of  all,  that  is  whether  complete 
markets  exist,  and  that  for  the  US  economy  as  a  whole  using  the  US  panel 
microeconomic  data.  She  employed  a  number  of  individual  characteristics  to 
represent  idiosyncratic  shocks to test  the  complete insurance  proposition13 using 
cross sectional regressions. With observations on consumption  and income for  10 
695 households from the Consumer Expenditure Survey she ran regressions using 
both the change of consumption and the rate of growth of consumption. For the 
latter, there were some cases where idiosyncratic income growth mattered, but in the 
majority  of her  tests,  she  failed  to reject  the prediction  of the complete market 
models. However, it seems that there are some sources of individual-specific risks 
which can not be insured privately. 
Townsend (1 99  1) examined risksharing on somewhat smaller scale than Mace, using 
panel microdata for households in three poor villages in south India. He argued that 
such  villages are often  stable  over  time,  that  the  agricultural  and  weather-based 
sources of risk are both stationary and well-understood,  and that the broad common 
knowledge of the residents about one another is able to control problems of moral 
hazard. The data consisted of observations on the time-period  1975-  1984 on samples 
of 33, 34 and 36 households in each of the three villages. Townsend found that the 
co-movement  of individual consumptions with  the  average  consumption  of each 
village  is  stronger  than  the  similar  co-movement  of  income.  These  results  are 
consistent  with  the  risksharing  proposition,  but  perhaps  also  with  autartic 
consumption smoothing by each household separately. However, in line with Mace 
(1 991) he found evidence that consumption changes respond to idiosyncratic income 
shocks. Although it should be kept in mind (as with all of studies examined) that the 
measurement error in income may certainly be important factor. 
The optimality condition for Pareto optimal allocations in an N-household  economy, 
derived  from  a  planning  problem,  where  a  weighted  sum  of  household's  time 
separable utilities is maximized, states that discounted growth of marginal utility is 
constant  across  households,  and  given  aggregate  consumption,  individual 
households'  endowments do not enter into the determination of discounted marginal 
utility growth. That is, under appropriate conditions on the period  utility hnction, 
consumption  growth  should  be  cross-sectionally  independent  of  idiosyncratic 
variables that are exogenous to consumers. Cochrane (1991) used Panel  Study on 
Income Dynamics (PSID)  over the period  1980-1983 to test whether the cross- 
sectional variation of the growth rate of individual household food consumption was 
l3 The changes in individual consumption are determined by changes in aggregate consumption 
rates rather than by changes in idiosyncratic  variables. independent  of  various  reported  exogenous  shocks  to  the  households  using 
following empirical specification: 
where  CA,  1 C:  is the non-durable consumption growth of household j;  and  X:+,  is 
an  idiosyncratic  (i.e.  household  specific)  shock  variable,  which  is  under  fbll 
consumption  insurance  statistically  independent  of  an  individual  households 
consumption allocations. If consumption growth is cross-sectionally independent of 
idiosyncratic variables coefficient P should equal zero in regression. 
Cochrane found that consumption changes are strongly related to income changes (a 
bit contradictionary to results of Mace and Townsend results). Consumption falls in 
response to long illness and  to involuntary job  losses, though not to employment 
spells, strike-related work loss, or involuntary moves. 
These results of Cochrane (199 1) (and to some extent Mace (1 99 1) and Townsend 
(1991)) question the existence of  a complete markets and also indicate that there are 
many individual-specific risks that apparently cannot be insured privately. However, 
competitive markets in  explicit  contingent claims are not  necessary to implement 
consumption-insured allocations at individual level if there are other institutions that 
can  provide  such  consumption  insurance  (for  example  governmental  fiscal  or 
intergenerational transfers). Indeed it seems that there is a role for public smoothing 
of regional and individual-specific fluctuations. 
Atkeson  and  Bayoumi  (1993)  used  individual  income  as  a  proxy  to  measure 
asymmetric  shocks and  investigated the  consumption insurance hypothesis using 
cross-sectional  regressions.  They  found  some  evidence  of  pooling  idiosyncratic 
shocks. 
To  summarize,  it seems that the assumption of complete asset markets is at  odds 
with the facts of real world. Quite generally, one can argue that labor income against 
all contingencies cannot be privately insured; some of the shocks cannot be foreseen 
in order to provide sufficient contracts. Thus, even with free and costless trade in 
assets  there is no reason to expect high correlations even between tradeable-goods 
of consumptions of different countries and therefore conditions weaker than perfect 
correlation will  characterize the relation between  countries'  ex post  intertemporal 
marginal rates of substitution. However, evidence in Obstfeld (1995) and Soerensen 
et al. (1995) indicate that there has been increased trade in broader range of financial 
assets and it is increasing all the time. 
Eventually, research on consumption insurance should try to isolate the alternatives 
rather than simply reject the null hypothesis of complete insurance. Ideally, lack of 
insurance  should  be  tied  to  problems  of  imperfect  enforceability  of  contracts, 
irrational  behavior  of economic units,  informational  asymmetries,  and  so forth. 
Following two chapters are devoted to puzzles that may help to explain violations of international consumption insurance and potential gains that are unexploited even in 
the presence of existing imperfect asset market structure. 
3 CAPITAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS 
The main conclusion of the previous chapter is the low degree of risksharing among 
countries.  That is fluctuations  in national  consumption are highly  correlated with 
fluctuations in  national  income but  not  highly  correlated with  fluctuations in  the 
world  economy  as  a  whole,  which  indeed  is  against  the  theory  of  international 
consumption insurance. 
It  is  often  argued  in  the literature that  when  risksharing  occurs capital  mobility 
should be high, portfolios  should be  diversified, credit markets should be efficient 
and  correlations  between  domestic savings  and  investments  should  be  low.  This 
chapter focuses on capital markets alone, and on the imperfections in  the existing, 
'outside  insurance'  market  structure that  may  explain  explicitly  observed  weaker 
than  perfect  correlations  between  ex  post  intertemporal  marginal  rates  of 
substitution. 
3.1 Capital Mobility 
The perfect capital mobility can be seen as necessary but not sufficient condition of 
international risksharing: capital mobility allows economic units to trade differential 
consumption  risks.  In  this  sub-chapter  it  is  studied  whether  the  lack  of perfect 
consumption insurance is due to an extreme form of capital market imperfection: 
that is immobile capital. 
Law of One Price approach: The most basic implication of perfect capital mobility is 
that the price of the asset must be the same wherever it is traded. A popular method 
to test the capital mobility is to test whether interest parity conditions hold. 
Covered Interest Parity (cIP)14 states that capital flows equalize interest rates across 
countries and this should be filly reflected in forward rate discount: 
where i is domestic and i* is foreign nominal interest rate, fd is the forward rate 
discount  on the domestic currency.  Since the exchange risk  has been  eliminated, 
there  is  a  presumption  that  any  departure from  CIP  must  owe  to  'country'  or 
'political'  risk factors (i.e. transaction costs, information costs, capital controls and 
country-specific laws). 
I 
I  Empirical  tests ( see  e.g. Frankel  (1991,  1992)) have  found  by  that  CIP holds 
I  relatively  well.  It is worth  of noting  that  departures from  CIP were  on average 
smaller during the  1980s than  during the  1970s. This naturally implies increasing 
trend towards international integration of capital markets. Secondly departures from 
14 Risk aversion assumed, so there is demand for insurance. CIP were generally smaller for industrial countries than developing ones. In other 
words capital markets in  industrial countries are more integrated than in  developing 
countries. 
It can be concluded that capital is mobile at least in short-run (i.e. asset and money 
markets are well  integrated).  Since the  on-shore  and  off-shore interest rates  are 
equalized so that there is no arbitrage, one is tempted to conclude that there are no 
barriers to trade agent specific risks. Against this background the unexplained puzzle 
seems to be  why  the  observed  degree of  risksharing  is  so  low.  It  may  be  that 
imperfect consumption insurance among the industrial-countries to a large extent 
reflects incompleteness of international asset-market rather than simple phenomenon 
of low international capital mobility or market segmentation. 
3.2 Portfolio Diversification 
Intuition behind  international portfolio diversification is that risk-averse units try to 
diversifl regional risk away by  purchasing financial assets. Assets, indeed, provide 
insurance - they differ in yields, riskiness and in the ease with which they can be 
liquidated. Especially, they have different pay-offs in different states of the world. If 
asset transactions are not restricted, purchases and sales of assets allow economic 
units  to  tailor  the  time-path  of  consumption  to  their  needs  and  preferences, 
unconstrained by the time path of their unit-specific incomes. Intuitively international 
diversification of asset positions  would  presumably  form  one principal  means  of 
insulating national income and consumption fiom fluctuations in national production. 
Over the last two decades deregulations of financial markets and relaxation of capital 
controls have brought about increased opportunities for international investment and 
risksharing. In the EU area capital markets are integrated by  the 'Common Market 
1992' making it easier for economic units to insure themselves against temporary 
shocks.  The  potential  gains  of  risksharing  fiom  diversification  of  investment 
portfolios across national markets have been recognized for  some time. Existing 
models of international portfolio choice predict  that  foreign investors should hold 
national market portfolios or portfolios tilted towards high expected return stocks. 
Since the late 1960s it is well-known that investing abroad reduces the variance of a 
portfolio because foreign shares display low correlation with domestic shares. This 
literature  focuses  on  the  variance  reduction  resulting  from  international 
diversification and this unambiguously improves the performance of the portfolio of 
an investor who ranks portfolios according to their mean and variance of return. 
Even in the presence of barriers to international investment, it is possible to reduce 
the variance of a portfolio's return and to reduce its mean return as well. Implication 
is thus that the studies that focus on the variance reduction benefits of international 
diversification are not sufficient to make the case for international diversification. To 
make this case it has to be argued that expected return are such that the variance 
reduction  benefit  of  international  diversification is  not  offset  by  lower  expected 
return. Various authors have noticed that investors can reap gains from holding a global 
portfolio  instead  of  local  one.  Grubel  (1968)  and  Levy  and  Sarnat  (1970),  for 
example, point  out that the optimal portfolio for the US  investor is  very  different 
from the portfolio just consisting of the US stocks. Solnik (1974) in turn found that 
a global portfolio would be half  as risky as the portfolio consisting only of the US 
stocks. 
3.2.1 Evidence on Portfolio Diversification 
Although, as  stated above,  comparable assets seem  to be  well  arbitraged  across 
borders, recent evidence on portfolio diversification appears to go earlier findings. 
Despite potential gains from investing internationally, there is obviously only limited 
international portfolio diversification. This phenomenon is called home bias. 
Recent  research  has  also  put  much  effort  to  measure  gains  from  international 
portfolio diversification under very limited barriers to asset trade. Tesar and Werner 
(1992) calculated the share of each of the five countries'  equity and bond  markets 
from of the  five-country  aggregate (Canada,  Germany,  Japan,  United  Kingdom, 
USA).  According  to  the  simplest  view  of  portfolio  diversification,  an  investor 
choosing a well-diversified portfolio in  1990 would  hold roughly 40% in  Japanese 
equities, 39% in the US equities, 13% in British equities, 5% in German equities and 
3% in Canadian stocks. Another way to make a case for international diversification 
is to show that the domestic market portfolio is an inefficient portfolio when agents 
are allowed to hold foreign as well as domestic assets. 
Tesar and Werner (1992) calculated the historical means and standard deviations of 
US dollar-denominated returns on equity and bond investments using FT-Actuaries 
indices15 in  five,  already  mentioned,  countries  and  the  value-weighted  World 
portfolio. The US market has the lowest standard deviation during the 1980s relative 
to other four countries; only the world portfolio was less risky. Tesar and Werner 
found that Canadian and US equity and bond markets are highly correlated, 0.78 and 
0.79, respectively. Canadian and US  equity returns are also highly correlated with 
British stock returns. However, it was found that US and Canadian residents invest 
heavily  in  each  other's  markets:  over 25% of  US  foreign investment is  held  in 
Canadian stocks, while 71% of Canadian foreign equity investment is placed in the 
USA.  The  correlations between expected  excess returns  across  five markets  are 
indicate that there are benefits from diversification. The data also indicated that that 
excess returns in Canada, the UK  and the US were more highly positively correlated 
with each other than returns in any  of these three countries were with Japan and 
Germany. Thus, it could predicted that, ceteris paribus, investors in the US should 
prefer investing in  German and  Japanese equity to investing in  Canadian and  the 
British equity. Low correlations between bond returns in turn suggest that there are 
l5 The FT-Actuaries Indices are jointly compiled by the Financial Times Ltd., Goldman and Sachs 
&Co, and County NatWest Securities in conjunction with the Institute of Actuaries and Faculty of 
Actuaries. The indices are available for 24 countries and 12 regions. Each index is representative of 
the market structure covered and captures approximately 75% of market capitalization. likely  to  be  substantial  gains  from  diversification  across  bond  as well  as  equity 
markets. 
Perhaps the most widely cited  estimate, presented  by  French  and  Poterba (1991), 
states that in December 1989, US investors held 94% of their stock market wealth in 
domestic  equities;  Japanese  investors  98%;  and  UK  investors  82%.  Tesar  and 
Werner (1995)16 in turn reported the stock-value  of aggregate portfolio investment 
abroad as a percentage of the domestic stock and bond market capitalization values. 
The figures  indicate that  the level  of portfolio  investment  in  most  countries  has 
increased since early to mid-1970s. In  1990 foreign security holdings amounted to 
32% in the UK,  11% in Japan and  10% in Germany 4% in Canada and only 3% in 
the US. Further decomposition of the US investment position  shows that there has 
been a doubling of the investment position (from 1975 to 1990) in foreign equities, 
US investment in foreign bonds has remained at a fairly constant level of 3%. Yet, it 
should be kept in mind that the share of the US stock equity market in the sample of 
Tesar and Werner has roughly halved since the mid-1970's while the USA's share of 
bond  markets  has  remained  nearly  constant  over  period.  This  implies  that  this 
increase is smaller than the rate implied by  a buy-and-hold  strategy with continual 
reinvestment  of capital  gains.  In  turn,  Canadian  holdings  of foreign  equity  have 
remained nearly constant over time. Yet, in all cases the actual investment positions 
are still substantially lower than the limits implied by foreign investment restrictions. 
Investors considering diversification across national securities markets are concerned 
with both changes in the underlying security values and changes in exchange rates. 
Tesar  and  Werner  (1995)  considered  also  investment  portfolios  that  were  fblly 
hedged  against  currency  risk.  Authors  assumed  that  the hedging  strategy  of  an 
investor is to enter into a forward contract at the beginning of each month to sell the 
current  foreign  currency  value  of  the  foreign  currency  value  of  the  foreign 
investment position in 30 days. Thus the return on the portfolio of foreign securities 
investment plus a forward contract (from a perspective of a US investor) is: 
where fi  is the local currency return of a foreign  security index over the period 
from t to t+l;  st is natural logarithm of the exchange rate expressed as US dollars 
per unit of foreign currency; A,,+]  is logarithm of the one-month forward exchange 
rate; and rUSDt  (m is the US (foreign) short-term interest rate. 
Calculated Sharpe ratios1'  of a portfolio of domestic securities in each of the five 
countries, the market portfolio denominated in each of the five currencies and the 
market portfolio hedged against exchange rate risk indicated for example that British 
investor holding a portfolio of the UK  equities in the 1980-1  990 earned Sharpe ratio 
0.019. By diversifying across national equity markets, the return-risk ratio increased 
to  0.129.  If  the  market  portfolio  was  hedged  against  exchange  rate  risk,  the 
'' See also Tesar and Werner (1992) 
17 The Sharpe ratio is defined as the mean return divided by the standard deviation. compensation for risk increased further to 0.132. However, hedging exchange rate 
risk improved the Sharpe ratio in only two of the five countries. 
Finally,  perhaps  the  most  striking  example  of  incomplete  risk  diversification  is 
tendency for most households to invest in undiversifiable, region-specific real estate. 
3.2.2  What Explains Home Bias 
Although it is quite impossible to quanti@ how far observed portfolios are from an 
optimal  portfolio,  there are  number  of potential  explanations  for  the home bias, 
however none of them is very convincing. The reasons could range from transaction 
costs to internationally asymmetric  information  (Gehrig,  1993) to differential  tax 
treatment of domestic and foreign investors (Gordon and Varian,  1989) to irrational 
expectations concerning the relative  returns  on  domestic and  foreign  investments 
(French  and  Poterba,  1990,1991).  Each  of  these  explanations  is  now  briefly 
discussed. 
First, there is the exchange rate risk. But foreign exchange risk can be eliminated via 
hedging for holdings of securities from the equity markets. However,  it  should be 
remembered  that  it  may  not  always  be  beneficial  to fully  hedge  exchange  risks, 
because  of  hedging  costs.  Hence,  if  foreign  exchange  risk  is  an  obstacle  of 
international  diversification, one would  expect for example investors to invest  in 
mutual hnds  hedged against foreign exchange risk. 
Second, there may  exist tax differences.  Investors are typically  subject  to foreign 
withholding taxes on dividends from foreign  investments.  Yet,  domestic residents 
receive  tax credits on foreign withholding taxes. There seems to be a greater tax 
advantage to holding foreign than domestic assets since it is easier to underreport 
foreign investment income. 
Third, transaction costs may be large when investing in foreign markets. According 
to French and Poterba (1990) costs of trading may be lower in more liquid markets 
and this should incline all investors toward the most liquid markets, not toward their 
'home-market'.  Since all shares must be held by someone, differences in transaction 
costs should be reflected in differences in expected returns. Cole and Obstfeld (1  99  1) 
argued  that  even  small  transaction  barriers  could  substantially  discourage 
international  diversification.  Backus  et  al.  (1992)  confirmed  in  an  empirically 
calibrated representative-agent  model that introducing small transaction cost could 
lead to an equilibrium very close to the autarky allocation. However, the large equity 
flows across borders (for example for the United States in 1989, gross foreign equity 
purchases were fifty times net purchases)  suggests that transaction costs are not able 
to  explain  home-bias.  The  importance  of  transaction  costs  remains,  however, 
unclear. 
Fourth, there is a risk of expropriation associated with investing abroad. If investors 
think that there is some probability that they might have trouble repatriating  their 
holdings,  the  expected  return  on their  foreign  shares  would  be  lower  than  the 
expected  return  for residents.  As long as this political  risk  does not  materialize, investors will look like they are insufficiently diversified internationally. A problem 
with this argument is that money  markets seem well-integrated at short maturities 
and hence do not reflect potential political risks (Kang and  Stultz, 1995). To make 
political risk convincing it must be rationalized why foreign investors would be more 
at risk with equities than with short-term money market instruments. 
Fifth, capital controls may be binding and could have effects on portfolio holdings, 
although only few of them appear to bind  at present. By now it should be clear that 
the current level of international portfolio investment seems to be  well  below  any 
institutional feasibility constraints. 
According to French and Poterba (1991) barriers to international investments would 
have to be more substantial than most observers seem to think they are and thus it is 
not convincing to argue that the limited international diversification of portfolios is 
due only to observable barriers to international investment. Tesar and Werner (1  995) 
followed this line of explanation and suggested that investors primarily do not seek 
portfolio diversification by  choosing foreign markets which  have  low  correlation 
with the domestic market. Rather other factors such as geographic proximity, strong 
trade linkages or the lack of language -barrier  may matter potentially even more than 
the diversification motive per se for international portfolio choice. 
Different predictive distributions (or even irrational expectations) for stock returns 
could also be one way to explain the home bias. French and Poterba (1990,  1991) 
report that differences in expectations among investors judging the same market are 
striking. Estimates  of  French  and  Poterba  suggest  that  Japanese  investors,  for 
example, expect returns from Japanese stocks which are more than 300 basis points 
greater than the returns US investors expect. Similar differences can be seen in the 
expectations of foreign and  domestic investors in  both the US  an the UK  equity 
markets. Overall these results suggest that investors expect domestic returns that are 
systematically higher  than  those  implied  by  diversified  portfolio.  Investors  may 
impute some extra risk to foreign investments because they know less about foreign 
markets, institutions and firms.18 If investors feel that they need to expend greater 
resources when investing abroad relative to the cost of analyzing domestic stocks, 
which they are familiar with, then this may explain why they do not diversify abroad. 
This suggests that hrther research on the analysis of portfolio choice with different 
information gathering costs for domestic and foreign securities is needed. 
It  seems obvious  that  investors  do  not  rank  portfolios  according  to  mean  and 
variance of return. Investors might tailor their asset holding to hedge against changes 
in variables that matter to them. Stultz (1981) argues that investors' desire to hedge 
against unanticipated  changes in  their  consumption  and  investment  opportunities 
might  lead to home bias.  It is possible to consider many variables that  affect the 
expected  utility  of  an  investor  and  hence  also  the  diversification of  his  or  her 
portfolio. Thus, in a setting where investors insure themselves against unanticipated 
18 Psychologists have studied this pattern of behaviour and presented evidence that households 
behave as though unfamiliar gambles are riskier than familiar ones, even though both of the games 
would have identical probability distribution (see Gatti and Tversky, 1990). changes in  state variables, it may well be that limited diversification is optimal even 
though markets are fully integrated internationally. Kang and Stulz (1995) followed 
this line of explanation and argued that hedging against state variables often seems to 
imply that investors should have portfolios overweighted in foreign securities rather 
than in domestic securities. 
Investors might also want to hold  a portfolio that has a return negatively correlated 
with the return to their human  capital and  income streams. However, it would  be 
seem more likely that foreign securities have returns negatively correlated with the 
returns to human capital. Stockman and Dellas (1989) argued that indeed if variables 
in the utility function that are internationally tradeable are not separable from those 
that are non-tradeable there may be exists a significant home-asset bias in investors' 
portfolio decisions.lg  Baxter, Jerman and King (1994) argued that taking the return 
to human capital into account (which is largely non-tradeable) should lead the US 
investors to be  short in  the US  market portfolio of traded  securities and  long in 
foreign securities because the return to human capital are so highly correlated with 
the return to the US market portfolio of traded securities. However, further research 
on international and  domestic correlations among returns to human  and  physical 
capital is necessarily needed. For  example,  Golub (1991)  showed  that  corporate 
profits  and  labor income were negatively  correlated in Japan, which may  explain 
Japanese portfolio home bias. 
To  summarize,  home  portfolio  bias  can  be  seen  as  a  piece  of  evidence  against 
international  risksharing  -  that  is  many  of  the  industrialized  countries  are  not 
diversified nearly to the extent that  standard variance reduction models of global 
portfolio  choice would predict.  Therefore from the point  of view  of these  simple 
models there are unexploited risksharing gains associated with reduced consumption 
variability both on national and individual level. Although the derivation of optimal 
portfolios that are consistent with the observed the past consumption behavior may 
prove to be a difficult, if not an impossible task. 
What is the message of the home bias from the perspective of risksharing? In the 
beginning of the section it was stated that international diversification of investment 
portfolios provide a sharing  of income risks  across countries. In  addition, it  was 
found out in 2.2 that correlations between domestic output and consumption growth 
rates are high.  This failure has two sources: If it is assumed  that  transactions in 
capital markets  are presented  by  the net  exchange of financial assets for  current 
consumption, then this failure indicates that such exchanges were undone by  forcing 
individuals to consume each period  an amount  equal to sum of the income from 
human  and  non-human capital. There are two explanations for this: One may  be 
liquidity  constrained or much  of the financial wealth is tied  up  in  region-specific 
assets. In reality both explanations seem to be relevant for individual agents: Most 
individuals are liquidity constrained and much of the financial wealth is invested in 
region-specific real estate. 
Similar points can be found from studies of already discussed international consumption 
comovements. Tesar (1993) argued that in the presence of tradeable and non-tradeable goods the 
correlation of aggregate consumption growth rates need not to be high. However,  more  careful  analysis  of the  correlation  between  domestic  returns  to 
physical  capital and domestic human capital, real estate and bulk  of other relevant 
national  income  components  must  be  done.  In  addition,  careful  attention  to 
information or 'search costs'  must be paid. Actually, what is needed  is  a general- 
equilibrium  model  assuming  imperfect  asset  market  and  some  form  of 
'segmentation'  to judge whether there are aggregate losses from imperfect portfolio 
diversification.  20 
The most severe limitation of the discussion above is that it concentrated on assets 
traded in securities markets. An important question in this context is to which extent 
existing  asset  markets  can  actually  facilitate  risksharing  against  contingencies 
relevant for different units and whether risks associated with non-traded assets (e.g. 
human capital) is hedgeable at all. Limitation in the existing financial markets  are 
especially  associated  with  risks  related  to  physical  capital,  while  modern  stock 
markets  facilitate direct  hedging  of only  small  part  of the  risks  associated  with 
national income fluctuations (i.e. corporate earnings). 
Generalizing, then, one could conclude that most private agents seem to be unable to 
hedge against adverse shocks. If insurance cannot be provided by the markets there 
is indeed a role for government intervention. 
3.3 Credit Market Imperfections: Asymmetric Information 
Risk averse economic units should be able to smooth out the effects of temporary 
asymmetric shocks by borrowing (and lending) via credit markets for the purpose of 
the consumption  smoothing in  the case that the shock  is realized. When  outside 
insurance opportunities are used only to a limited extent (i.e. investment decisions on 
insurance are not made in advance), debt contracts written will in general play two 
roles: allocation of resources and  allocation of risks. With perfect  capital markets 
agents can dissave and borrow within the bounds of solvency at the same interest 
rate at which they can save and lend.  In practice, however, there is a bunch of well- 
known reasons - from adverse selection to imperfect monitoring of outcomes - why 
such  insurance  schemes  might  not  be  viable.  And  therefore  units  are unable  to 
borrow  against uncertain  future incomes.  Similarly, it might be  hard  for two (or 
more) governments to implement a direct system of insurance through inter-regional 
transfers. 
3.3.1 Credit Markets and Sovereign Nations 
Although there is no central fiscal institution at the community level, there already 
exists a country-specific insurance system that works as an automatic consumption 
20 Asset prices appear to be too volatile from the perspective of theoretical literature on asset pricing 
and can give rise to divergent estimates of international diversification gains. Mankiw and Zeldes 
(1991) found from the data of  1984 Panel Study of Income Dynamics that the standard deviation of 
consumption growth of stockholders as a group is about 50 percent higher than that of non- 
stockholders as a group. However, even this finding does not enable one to reject aggregate gains 
from international riskpooling. smoother:  namely  world  credit  markets.  There  is  a  scope  particularly  for  the 
borrowing of sovereign nations because it is obvious enough that governments have 
better and cheaper access to credit markets than private agents. In cases of adverse 
shock governments can reallocate consumption possibilities to 'unlucky'  individuals 
via transfers: A positive transfer represents subsidy and a negative transfer represents 
a tax.21 
Finance  is  provided  by  the  surplus countries,  which  are not  hit  by  the  negative 
shocks,  at  least  not  so large  ones.  Yet,  the  complete  consumption  insurance  is 
possible  only  under  perfect  information  conditions.  In  this  section  informational 
asymmetries are taken account so that first best contracts cannot be written.22 
Recent theoretical  research  shows how rational lenders may respond to imperfect 
information about the borrowers by  rationing credit them.23 Quite naturally, credit 
rationing  can  result  from  a  market  imperfection  and  if  binding  it  can  make 
consumption  smoothing  by  an  individual  country  difficult,  if  not  impossible, 
particularly  in  the  presence  of  severe  adverse  shock  (this  may  explain  high, 
precautionary saving-investment correlations, see next section). 
In the case of assets subject  to default, the expected return is determined  by  the 
promised interest rate and the probability and consequences of default. The situation 
can be characterized simply in the following way: 
In  the  case  where  there  is  positive  probability  of  complete  default,  I-7~,  the 
relationship between the promised interest rate, R, and the expected interest rate, E, 
is given by 
Because of the probability of default (I-$,  the expected interest rate is less than the 
promised interest rate. Therefore, the promised interest rate on these contracts must 
21 Typically, such an optimal rule of redistribution derives from a set-up, where there are N agents 
(citizens) and fixed individual welfare weights o',  j=l, 2,.  .  .  ,  N. The local social planner maximizes 
N 
the social-welfare function of the form wo  =  c  o';  by distributing consumption possibilities 
on each date and in each state of the world, among the N agents. If  Cfr is national consumption 
possibilities on date t, a necessary condition for distributing it efficiently among the agents is o'Vo,, 
= u'U'O,,  (for all agents  j and I), where Uo,c  is the partial derivative of the agent's utility function 
with respect to c (consumption). Thus the marginal rates of substitution across states of the world 
are equalized locally in an efficient, first-best allocation. 
22 The absence of efficient risksharing in debt contracts is usually explained by different types of 
informational asymmetries. With complete contracting repayment would be contingent, a function 
of the prevailing state of the world. 
23 For example JafTee and Russell (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) 
and Metcalf (1990). However, an open question is to what extent the specific reasons to credit 
rationing drawn from adverse selection models of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) sense are valid also for 
international debt (see discussion on Guesnerie, 1986). be higher than the interest rate on safe assets, which bear risk free rate  RE^^ With no 
risk premia, the expected interest rate (with default risk) is equal to risk free rate, or 
The relationship between default risk and the rate on risky debt can be written: 
This  shows  that  as  the  probability  of  default  increases, the  spread  between  the 
interest rate on risky asset and the risk free rate also increases. However, it should be 
kept in  mind  that the spread may, in  fact, reflect  some other factors just  that  the 
probability of default. 
A specific aspect of international credit contracts originates from the legal situation 
of the lender. That is a country can more easily default on its debt than  a private 
agent. However, private creditors are able to take number  of retaliatory actions to 
penalize  defaulting  debtors. Among  the most  important  of these penalties  is the 
exclusion from future borrowing (and consumption smoothing), because most of the 
typical countries are likely to be multi-time borrowers. Thus governments choose to 
repay because they assume that at some time in  the future they may be faced with 
another adverse shock during which it will again desire to smooth its consumption. 
Next this feature of debt contracts is considered more carefully. 
Eaton and  Gersovitz (1981) constructed a theoretical model to analyze situations 
where repayment of sovereign debt is in doubt. Penalty, in the case of a default and 
implied credit ceiling were particularly important aspect of their model. Borrowers 
who repudiate face future exclusion from credit markets. In their model borrowers 
will  not  pay  the  price  (which  are  adjusted  to  allocate  finite  resources  among 
consumers) if they default. Desired borrowing depends positively on the growth rate 
and the standard deviation of income. The borrower is more likely to default the 
more  he  has  borrowed.25 Thus  a  non-price  allocation mechanism,  that  is  credit 
rationing26,  may arise. The size of the ceiling is determined the by lenders' perception 
of the borrowers' disutility of exclusion. It was shown that the credit ceiling is an 
increasing function of the income variance but  an increase in  the growth rate  of 
income has an ambiguous effect on the credit ceiling: A negative effect of growth on 
the ceiling is more likely the more risk averse the country is. The empirical results 
from a  sample of poor  countries accords fairly  well  with  the  theory.  Estimated 
coefficients indicate that both  credit ceilings and  willingness to borrow  rise with 
increases in the percent variability of exports. However, the level of demand  does 
not vary with income. 
24 Finance theory implies that default premia must be positive in the presence of a default risk, but 
risk premia may be zero even with a default risk. 
25 In the model the probability of default in period t increases monotonically with current debt 
service obligations, d,. 
26 At some critical interest rate (Rc) and critical level of borrowing (Bc),  the credit supply curve 
becomes vertical. In contrast to the model discussed above, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) argue, also on 
theoretical grounds that reputational effects are not sufficient to induce countries to 
repay their debts. The authors also argue that  foreign creditors should be  able to 
impose  direct  sanctions  in  order  to  induce  repayment.  They  suggest  that  trade 
embargoes may serve such a purpose. 
However, the models discussed above do not recognize how the penalty originates 
and what are its incentive effects. Eaton et al. (1986) focused on the incentives for 
borrowers to repay and, on the other hand, for lenders to continue supplying capital. 
The penalty of exclusion from hture borrowing makes sense only in models with 
infinite  horizon.  Even  in  an  infinite  horizon  models  exclusion  penalty  would  be 
ineffective if the model ever predicts that a point will be reached after which the flow 
will always be from debtor to creditor. 
If demand for loans derives from consumption smoothing the cost of not being able 
to access international credit markets is that countries must obtain other sources to 
sustain  consumption  smoothing  or  it  must  accept  greater  fluctuations  in  its 
consumption patterns. These costs of exclusion from credit markets are higher: the 
greater the borrower's elasticity of marginal utility, the more variable the income, the 
lower the world interest rate (i.e. the lower the cost of smoothing via international 
credit markets), and the more limited domestically available options for consumption 
smoothing are. It seems that uncertainty for possibilities of smoothing consumption 
in the fbture plays a crucial role in  forcing countries to repay their debts and that 
reputational effects may work as an effective enforcement mechanism. 
However, danger of unenforceability of contracts can imply credit rationing, and that 
lending is probably too low relative to what would relative to what would be optimal 
if contracts were enforceable. 
3.3.3  Evidence on Credit Rationing and Discussion of Further Implications 
English (1996) studied the defaults and repudiations of US states in the 1840s and 
argued on this basis that direct sanctions are not  needed  to induce repayment of 
sovereign  debts.27 States  that  defaulted  or  repudiated  were  considerably  more 
indebted than other states. The defaulted states had debts of more than 20 percent of 
annual state income, while states that had debts but did not default had debt only 9 
percent of state income on average. However, the states that repudiated completely 
had  somewhat  lower  debt  burdens  than  the  states  that  repudiated  partially.  In 
addition, some heavily indebted states did not default (e.g, debt to income ratio of 
Alabama was over 35) while, in turn, some relatively lightly indebted states did (debt 
to income ratio of Mississippi was 16). 
''  Debts of US  states can be seen as a sovereign debts because the US constitution precludes suits 
against states to enforce the payment of debts. However, the US states were insulated from direct 
sanctions that could have been imposed on individual countries because they were part of a 
powerful union of states. Despite lack of sanctions most defaulted states eventually repaid their debts in full. It 
appears that the cost of default is the prospect of loss of access to new loans and 
actually  rather  than  direct  sanctions, i.e. states  repaid  in  order to maintain  their 
access to international credit markets. The loss of access appears to have resulted 
from the  of damage to the reputation  of defaulting states in  credit  markets. The 
states that serviced their debts were able to borrow again in the 1840s and 50s while 
those that repudiated found it  difficult to do so. Of  the eleven  states that  repaid 
without interruption in  the early  1840s all  were  able  to borrow.  In  contrast,  the 
states that repudiated all of their debts were not able to borrow significant sums in 
the period before the Civil War. The experience of states that partially defaulted was 
more varied. Some states could not borrow until  after the war. Surprisingly, some 
states that  repudiated  their  debts were able to regain  access to credit markets by 
repaying only a fraction of their debts.  This evidence supports the implications of 
the  reputational  models  (i.e.  models  by  Eaton  and  Gersovitz and  Eaton  et  al.) 
discussed above. 
Bayoumi et al. (1995), by  specifLing a non-linear supply curve, studied the question 
whether  credit markets impose  sufficient  default  premia  to restrain  irresponsible 
borrowing. Following supply equation was estimated: 
where DUMt are  annual  dummy  variables; B  is  the  ratio  of  debt  to  gross  state 
product; TAXR is the highest marginal state tax rate for states that tax in-state  and 
out-of-state bonds differently; UN  is the level of unemployment in state i lagged one 
period;  and  FISC  is  an  index of the  strength  of  constitutional controls on  state 
borrowing. Coefficient a1  measures the level effect of yields and a*  measures the 
nonlinearity in the estimating equation caused by  the interaction between yields and 
interest payments. The literature on interest rates of state bonds has shown that the 
probability of default is affected by  cyclical factors and constitutional constraints on 
borrowing (see Liu and Thakor, 1984). Thus the econometric specification included 
a measure of the  strength of controls on state borrowing as well  as the  lagged 
unemployment rate. Their survey data covered municipal bond yields for US states. 
The supply equation was estimated on data for 38 states over period  198  1-1  990 
using non-linear, two-stage least squares. The point estimates implied a highly non- 
linear supply curve. At the mean values of sample, each percentage point increase in 
debt raises the promised yield  by  23  basis  points, and increased to over 35 basis 
points at  debt levels one  standard  deviation  above the mean  of the  sample. The 
backward bend in the credit supply curve occurred at a level of debt equal to llaz, at 
which point the market stops supplying debt. This point was reached at a debt level 
of 8.7  percent of gross state product. 
Results reported by Bayoumi et al. indicate that credit markets do appear to provide 
incentives for sovereign borrowers to restrain borrowing. These incentives appear to 
be imposed gradually at first, but eventually yield  spreads rise in a steep, non-linear 
way. However, at this point one is tempted to follow Grossman and van Huyck (1988)~~ 
and regard the current reschedulings reported by  English (1996) as a substitute for 
risksharing arrangements that were absent from the original debt contracts. Further, 
it  could  also  be  argued  that  under  commitment  hypothesis29 credit  markets  are 
working somehow imperfectly in  trying to smooth consumption. That is sovereign 
nations are not able to smooth their consumption perfectly after, first and foremost, 
severe adverse shock. 
Thus irrespective of whether credit rationing reflects market imperfection or more 
positive form of fiscal discipline there obviously is an insurance demand from some 
source  after  a  severe negative  shock  or  after  series  of shocks.  It  is  possible  to 
speculate that EU countries, partly because of the restrictions to use the inflation tax, 
are  not  able  to  self-insure  themselves  against  severe  macroeconomic  shocks,  if 
financial markets do not allow governments to borrow to the extent they do now. 
Also one should keep in mind that the Maastricht Treaty has imposed constraints on 
the flexibility of the national fiscal policies. Indeed suggestions have been presented 
that there would  be direct monetary  sanctions if the deficit ceiling of 3  percent  is 
exceeded. Arguments presented  above might increase the calls for looser monetary 
policy or raise the issue whether 'federal insurance arrangements' at the EU level are 
necessary. 
Indeed, in the presence of binding liquidity constraints some countries will be unable 
to smooth their  consumption over time3'  and therefore the marginal propensity  to 
consume out of available current resources would  be higher than predicted  by  the 
permanent income-life cycle model. This has obvious effects for changes in taxation 
in order to offset fluctuations (see chapter 4). According to Carroll (1992)  agents 
with a strong precautionary motive might even be given an additional incentive to 
save  by  the  impossibility  to borrow  in  the  event  of  a  negative  income  shock 
sometime in the fbture. In addition  as Jappelli and  Pagano  (1994)  showed in  an 
overlapping generation model the presence of liquidity constraints may increase the 
steady state aggregate saving rate (see next section for further analysis). 
Moreover,  it  is  always possible  that  even with  temporary  shocks credit  financed 
'self-insurance'  policies  are  not  successfbl.  If  consumers  are  Ricardian  or 
ultrarational  in  the  sense of Barro  (1974) this is  always  the case. According  to 
'Ricardian  equivalence'  theorem private consumers  'see through the public sector 
vail' and include all fbture tax payments that are needed to service and repay debt in 
their own balance sheets. In this case higher public demand would be offset by lower 
28 Authors constructed a model of debt as a contingent claim that both finance investment and 
faciliate risk-sharing. In this sense their model is in contrast to reputational theories of sovereign 
debt, which do not recognize debt as contingent-claim and hence do not distinguish excusable 
default from unjustifiable repudiation. 
29 Commitment hypothesis states that principal (P) is assumed to be Stackelberg leader, in sense 
that she is committed to the contract, which she formulates and offers to the agent (A). There will 
be no renegotiation expost, after A has made his choices given contract, and when P have acquired 
more information. (Gravelle and Rees, 1992) 
30 Among the first it was Flemming (1973) who argued that the inability to borrow against future 
income might cause consumption at least in the short-run to depend on current disposable income. private  demand  and, hence,  there would  be  no  expansionary effects on  aggregate 
economic  activity.  However,  it  is  questionable whether  the  strict  form  of  the 
Ricardian  equivalence  actually  holds.  Yet  if  private  agents  are  even  partially 
Ricardian then more efficient insurance policy can be achieved at the EU level, since 
ex ante it is impossible to know which country will suffer from negative shock. 
Another interesting question is if  reputational effects sustain foreign debt markets, 
then  exactly whose  reputation matters. Indeed,  English  (1996)  suggests that  the 
reputation of the federal government in  European capital markets was temporarily 
affected by  the states default. Based on this argument it can be asked is it  possible 
that  'errant'  borrowing  of a single member  country of EMU could  endanger the 
whole  union.  Spillovers (monetizing, interest  rates)  from  excessive  deficits  may 
endanger the whole union, that is the reputation of whole monetary union is indeed 
at stake. However, in EU a simple and  cheap candidate solution has already been 
created: no-bail-out-clause. 
It is likely that national fiscal policies lose much of their power to control national 
output and  employment even in the short run. Greater level  of openness sustains 
longer  aggregate demand  spillovers between  the  economies  and,  hence,  reduces 
government spending multipliers. 
3.4 International Allocation of Investments 
In this section saving-investment correlations are discussed. The question is not only 
whether capital markets are integrated, but  also more generally whether workable 
insurance markets against idiosyncratic shocks do exist. 
Intuition  suggests  that  aggregate  capital  flows  (and  private  capital  flows  in 
particular) offer significant welfare gains by  permitting sharing of national (as well as 
agent-specific)  consumption  risks.  The  reduction  in  national  welfare  due  to  a 
temporary negative shock is much  less pronounced  if  the economy  can  borrow 
resources from abroad in order to tide itself over the initial period of adjustment. 
Actually,  the  net  capital  flows in  the  balance  of  payments  is  a  measure  of the 
exchange of net foreign assets for current consumption. It is worth of noting that this 
aspect of consumption risksharing is not  distinct from, but  complementary to the 
risksharing arising from the holding of internationally diversified portfolios, which 
provides sharing of income risk across countries. 
However, as noted limited extent of international risksharing is evident in the data on 
current account as well as cross and net asset positions which, as stressed by Deaton 
(1  99 I), may indicate precautionary saving motives and inefficient allocation of hnds 
from surplus countries to deficit ones. The implication of this is that consumption of 
individual  agent  is more  closely  correlated  with  individual  rather  than  aggregate 
income, in contradiction to the complete insurance hypothesis. 
Yet, again the distinction between easily adjustable portfolio investments and real, 
foreign direct investments should be kept in mind. Portfolio investments are likely to 
be a risksharing tool for short-run fluctuations and real investments in turn may be seen as an instrument for long-run  buffer against idiosyncratic, permanent  shocks. 
Differences in  short-, medium and long-run  saving-investment correlations may be 
helpful  in  deciding which  level of public  intervention  should  indeed  be  aimed  at. 
Allocation of investments within a common currency area is an especially interesting 
case,  because  it  will  illuminate the possibilities of risksharing  of country-specific 
shocks in a monetary union. 
3.4.1 Theoretical Aspects of Capital Flows 
Well-functioning  capital  markets  should  allocate  investments  toward  its  most 
productive and efficient uses. An  indirect  approach is based  on an examination of 
saving and investment patterns originally proposed by Feldstein and Horioka (1  980). 
If capital is internationally mobile perfectly or if agents are able to perfectly insure 
themselves against idiosyncratic shocks then the following strong Feldstein-Horioka 
condition  holds:  Exogenous  changes  in  national  saving  rates  have  no  effect  on 
investment rates or, in  other words,  current  account imbalances are a possibility. 
Therefore,  from  the  point  of  view  of  risksharing,  current  account  can  vary 
systematically  over  the  cycle.  The  cyclical  properties  of  current  account  are 
determined by  two forces: the desire and ability of agents to smooth consumption 
using  international  markets  and  the  cyclical  variability  of  investment  that 
international capital flows permit. 
According  to Frankel's  (1992) classification of capital mobility criteria Feldstein- 
Horioka  condition  requires  that Real Interest Parity  (RIP)31  holds,  which  in  turn 
requires that  Uncovered  Interest  Parity  (UP)  as well  as Covered  Interest Parity 
(CIP) holds. 
So  if  national  saving  declined,  it  should  not  necessarily  'crowd  out'  domestic 
investment if the current  account were able to take up the slack  through  capital 
inflows. 
This crowding-out  property in the intertemporal context can be characterized using 
two components of aggregate demand: investment, I, and national saving, S. In per 
capita terms let At+,  denote the stock of net foreign claims of the economy at the end 
of period  t, r, net  interest between periods t+l and t,  Yt  net  domestic product in 
period t, Ct  private consumption, Gt public consumption; and It  net investment. The 
identity linking current account (CAt) to the saving investment balance is CAt = At+] 
- At  = rA, +  Yt  - Ct - Gt - It Crowding  out  suggests  the following  functional 
relationship F(S,I,X)=  0 between saving and investment relative to the GDP, here 
denoted  by  S and I respectively,  while X signifies other variables.  If the  exact 
fbnctional  form of F  is known the slope of the saving-investment  relationship  in 
31 RIP is defined: r -r* = (i-Ap")  (i*  -Ape), where r (r*) is domestic (foreign) real interest rate; i 
(i*)  is domestic (foreign) nominal interest rate; and Ape (Ape) is expected domestic (foreign) 
inflation. RIP can be decomposed further r - r* = (i -i* - f4  + Cfd  -As")  (he-  dpe  +Ape), where 
fd is forward rate discount on domestic currency; ds' is expected depreciation of domestic currency. 
The first term of right hand side is CP,  the second term is exchange risk premium. These two 
terms define UIP. The third term is ex-ante purchasing power parity. ($1)-space,  B6Sl  dip, would  also be  known where the derivative is  evaluated 
along the curve, holding other variables (X) fixed 
An intertemporal approach to the current account (see e.g. Sachs, 198  1; Frenkel and 
Razin,  1987 and  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff,  1994) in  the  context of  integrated  capital 
markets  owes  to  modern  intertemporal  consumption  and  saving  theory  for  the 
behavior of individual to the economy as a whole. In an ideal world the economy is 
assumed to be  able to freely borrow  (or lend) from other economies. This is  the 
paradigm  of perfect  consumption smoothing alluded to  earlier. In  the  absence of 
liquidity  constraint^^^,  individual agents smooth their consumption path relative to 
their lumpy income stream. Indeed, the same logic can be applied also at the level of 
nations.  The  intertemporal  approach  views  the  current  account  balance  as  the 
outcome of forward-looking dynamic saving investment decisions. As Brennan and 
Solnik (1989) argued net capital flow in the balance of payments is a measure of the 
exchange of net foreign assets for current consumption, holding constant domestic 
investment,  and  one  should  expect  that  the  distribution  of  state  contingent 
consumption resulting from net capital flow would Pareto dominate the distribution 
that would result if each nation were forced to finance the whole of its domestic 
investment for future consumption internally. Indeed it  can be  seen that key theme 
emerging from the discussion is that the current account response to various shocks 
depends on whether markets exist for insuring against the shocks' effects. 
The following example will illustrate the idea of trading consumption risk in current 
account  framework: When  all  agents  are  able  to  trade  their  risks  in  insurance 
markets33, some local economic shocks effectively become global  ones  and  their 
current  account  affects  are  diminished  or  even  eliminated.  A  situation  where 
economy  faces  a  temporary  negative  (positive)  asymmetric  output  shock  is 
considered.  Absent  insurance  market,  the  country  would  run  a  current  account 
deficit (surplus), decumulating (accumulating) some foreign assets to smooth the 
negative effects of the shock. However, under complete markets the economy has 
already traded much of its output risk to foreigners and purchased, in turn, claims on 
their risky output processes. Thus, the negative (positive) output shock of the home 
economy will cause small synchronized decrease (increase) in consumption of every 
country under complete insurance markets.34  But the shock will cause also a shift in 
income of each country as dividend payments flow to (from) the home country from 
(to) its foreign investors. Now it  can be  seem that no current account imbalances 
result. 
32 There are two possible definitions of liquidity constraints: According to the first, an individual or 
a household is unable, for whatever reason, to borrow against future earnings beyond a certain limit 
(which can be positive or zero). The second definition considers liquidity constrained individuals 
who face a difference between borrowing and lending interest rates, or more generally, individuals 
for whom interest rates are not independent of their net asset position. (Attanasio, 1994) 
33 If set of state-contingent claims is sufficiently rich, perfect capital mobility leads to optimal 
allocation of investments. However, as it was stated in 3.2 required "state-contingent assets" does 
not exist, then there is no automatic presumption that consumption is smoothed efficiently. This 
section continues the discussion and offers further evidence. 
34 See equation (4) in section 2.1. Temporary shocks will  have  different effects from  permanent  ones. A  temporary 
decline in income will be covered by  an increase in the deficit (decline in  surplus) to 
support consumption, while a permanent decline in  income necessitates a complete 
readjustment of consumption. The opening up of new investment opportunities that 
generate excess returns can be shown to lead to an increase in the current account 
deficit (decrease in  the surplus) that is somewhat larger than investment itself (the 
excess reflect  the larger  expected returns)  (Artis and  Bayoumi,  1989). But  that 
deficit  will  reflect  an  influx  of  savings  from  abroad  to  share  in  ownership  of 
incremental investment. The deficit does not reflect consumption smoothing effects, 
because all countries' income profiles are rising in proportion. Despite the deficit the 
intertemporal wealth distribution does not change. 
3.4.2  Evidence 
The intertemporal approach to the current account has been subjected to extensive 
formal testing. A empirical methodology was pioneered by  Feldstein  and  Horioka 
(1  980) who investigated the coefficient Pin  the following regression equation: 
where (VY);  is the ratio of gross domestic investment to gross domestic product in 
country  i;  (SN)i is  the  corresponding  ratio  of  gross  domestic  saving  to  gross 
domestic product; and  u; is random disturbance. To interprete the equation note that 
with perfect capital mobility,  an  increase in the saving country i would  cause an 
increase in investment in  all  countries; the  distribution of the incremental capital 
among countries would vary positively with initial capital stock of each country and 
inversely with the elasticity of the country's marginal product of capital schedule. In 
the extreme case of an infinitesimally small country relative to the world economy, 
the value  of p implied  by  perfect  consumption  smoothing (or  originally perfect 
capital mobility) would be zero. On the other hand for a relatively large country, the 
value of p would be of the order of magnitude of its share of total world capital. In 
principle in the case of perfectly mobile capital the true value of P would on average 
be less than 0.10. 
Feldstein and Horioka used the of 21 OECD countries for years between  1960 and 
1974. It was shown first that there are substantial differences in  domestic saving 
rates among these countries: Saving rate varied from 0.37 in Japan to 0.184 in the 
UK, the standard deviation was 0.045 and the differences have remained quite stable 
over  time.  The  estimates  overwhelmingly  rejected  the  implication  of  perfect 
consumption smoothing. The relation between the investment ratio and the saving 
ratio was significantly different from zero in every sample period. The estimate of p 
for the entire 15-yearsample was 0.89 (with standard error 0.07) when gross saving 
and investment were used and 0.94 (with standard error 0.09) when net saving and 
investment were used. The sample period was also split into the intervals 1960-64, 
1965-69 and 1970-74 and the regression was repeated for each of the subsample. In 
each  of the  tests  the  coefficient was  found  to be  in  the  range  of  0.85  -  0.95, insignificantly different from unity. In short, the evidence strongly contradicted both 
the hypothesis  of perfect  consumption  smoothing  and  capital  mobility.  Also  the 
evidence suggests that most  of any  incremental saving tends to remain, both over 
medium and long run, in the country that generates those savings. 
If  saving-investment regressions were a good test of international capital mobility, 
one  would  expect  to  see the  beta-coefficients to  fall  over  time.  However,  until 
recently this prediction has  not  been  supported by  the evidence. Feldstein  (1983) 
extending the cross-section35  study of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) to the end of the 
1970s found that countries that increased their saving in the period  1960-1973 also 
increased their investment on average by  an equal amount in the period  1973-1979. 
In  other words  these  findings  reconfirmed  the  earlier  FH  puzzle.  Feldstein  and 
Baccheta (1 991) updated with  quite similar results for a  1960-1  986 sample of 23 
OECD countries: For the full period the estimated coefficient for gross saving and 
investment  was  0.79. The  evidence  suggested  that  correlations  between  gross 
savings  and  investments had  fallen  over  time.  However,  when  net  saving  and 
investment were used the estimates showed no decline over time. Obstfeld (1994) 
updated hrther cross-sectional estimation using data for 22 OECD countries over 
five sub-periods from 1974 to 1990. Saving and investment rates were gross nominal 
flows divided by nominal GDP or GNP.  Estimates of fl are lower than Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) reported and on the whole somewhat lower than estimates reported 
by  Feldstein  and  Bacchetta (1991). Obstfeld's  results indicate a decade-to-decade 
downward trend  in  P: over  1974-1980, 0.867; over  1981-1990, 0.636. Yet,  the 
1986-1990  estimated  P  is  0.636  whereas  1981-1985  is  0.567.  However,  the 
coefficient differences are not significant in statistical terms, so the results cannot be 
taken as a evidence of a decreasing degree of international consumption smoothing. 
The intertemporal budget constraint of the economy (i.e. the Current Account = S- 
I) implies that in the long run CA should be in balance. Therefore, the possibility of 
short-run consumption smoothing can not be ruled out on a priori grounds even in 
the  international  context.  Since  saving  and  investment  shares  are  approximately 
equal  if  long  run  averages  of  saving  and  investment  shares  are  used  then  the 
correlation coefficient calculated from these long run averages is likely to be high. 
High correlations would erroneously signal low degree of international consumption 
smoothing because net capital flows in the mirror image of consumption over income 
during the period over which averages are taken, are ignored. 
Using  alternative method  in  pooled  cross-section of time  series Feldstein (1983) 
concluded  that  even  year  to  year  increases  in  saving  tend,  on  average,  to  be 
associated  with  increases  in  domestic  investment  in  the  same  country  by 
35 Obstfeld (1  994) makes point that cross-sectional estimation attempts to capture the relationship 
between long-run saving and investment rates. For this to succeed, each country's saving and 
investment rates must averaged over a sufficient  interval to eliminate the influence of  short-run 
fluctuations around long-run means. In turn,  time-series estimation strategy attempts to capture the 
short-run relation between national saving and investment. However, national saving rates are 
highly correlated with national investment rates, both in time series analyses of individual countries 
and in cross-section in which each country is treated as a single data point. approximately  an  equal  amounts.  Tesar  (1991)  reported  that  the  cross-country 
correlation between saving and investment is indeed robust to changes in  the length 
of the interval over the which  the  average is  taken. Her  sample  consisted of  23 
OECD countries during the time period  of  1960-86. For data averaged over five- 
year intervals the coefficient ranged from 0.73 to 0.92, depending naturally on the 
five-year interval. For three year averages, estimates ranged from 0.61 to 0.90, and 
for one-year averages the coefficient ranged  from 0.60 to 0.92. Sinn (1992) also 
tested hypothesis for 23 OECD countries based on the annual observations over the 
period 1960-88. The P coefficient varied from 0.41 to 0.83. He also reported decade 
averages of 0.87, 0.82 and 0.68. 
It  seems that non-trivial saving-investment correlations do exist  over the short  as 
well as long run phenomenon in cross-section samples and that these correlations are 
not  an  artifact of averaging over time intervals. This indeed is a puzzle from the 
point of view of intertemporal trade between countries. 
3.4.2.1 Econometric Critique 
The FH finding that Pis  closer to 1 than 0 has been reproduced many times. Several 
researchers have not been willing to, however,  draw the conclusion that  financial 
markets are not highly integrated, although they have accepted the close correlation 
between savings and investment shares as a robust empirical regularity. Actually, the 
econometric specification of Feldstein and Horioka has been under severe criticism. 
The  econometric  critique  falls  in  to  two  categories:  First,  do  regressions  of 
investment on saving actually measure the investment effect of an exogenous change 
in the saving rate (or in present cross-section terms is saving uncorrelated with ui)? 
Second  econometric  critique  concerns the  size  of  the  country.  Each  of  these 
arguments presented  may  bias  saving investment correlations, and  are each  now 
discussed in turn. 
3.4.2.1.1 Endogeneity Problem 
Difficulties  in  interpreting  saving-investment  correlations  arise  because  national 
saving and investment ratios are endogenous. National saving is endogenous if for 
example national saving and investment are both procyclical, as they are claimed to 
be, or if they both respond to the population or productivity growth rates. Another 
possible explanation for the simultaneity bias in the FH regression is the so called 
'policy reaction argument', according to which governments respond endogeneously 
to incipient current account imbalances with policies to change public saving in such 
way as to reduce the imbalances. 
Feldstein and Horioka themselves addressed the potential simultaneity of saving and 
investment shares by instrumental variable analysis. The set of instruments included a 
transformation  of  the  growth  of  private  income,  the  number  of  retirees  and 
dependent as a share of the total population, the benefit-earnings ratio of the social 
security program, and the labor force participation rate. The results were unchanged 
from the original ones. Dooley et al. (1987) addressed also the potential simultaneity of saving  and  investment  shares by  instrumental variables. Two instruments were 
used: the  ratio  of  military  expenditure to  GNP  and  the  ratio  of  dependents to 
working-age  population.  Surprisingly,  the  P  coefficient  for  industrial  countries 
increased somewhat from the original OLS regressions. The OLS coefficients over 
the periods 1960-73 and  1974-84 were 0.746 (with s.e. 0.104) and 0.736 (with s.e. 
0.173), respectively. 
Although, even post-1973 governments have sometimes adjusted fiscal or monetary 
policies in order to avoid large and protracted current account imbalances. Obstfeld 
and  Rogoff  (1994)  argue  that  the  evidence  on  this  current  account  targeting 
hypothesis is mostly anecdotal. However, the implications of these macroeconomic 
policies in the present context deserve hrther comments. Given that in the long-run 
CA  should  balance  even  under  high  capital  mobility,  government  policies  that 
systematically  target  the  CA  tend  to  produce  strong  cross-sectional  saving 
investment  association  (Summers,  1988). It  is  argued  that  governments  impose 
constraints on cross-border capital flows whenever the deficit  (or surplus) in  the 
current  account  exceeds  a  predetermined  level.  Controls  may  be  imposed  for 
example by  rising tax rates on incremental foreign borrowing. With such controls, r 
= r*  +  f(CA), f  '<O  and r and CA are determined simultaneously. 
Bayoumi (1990) tested the policy reaction argument by regressing time-series private 
sector saving on private sector investment. He found lower correlation coefficients 
for private sector saving and investment than corresponding coefficient on national 
level. Therefore he argued that the policy reaction is supported by the evidence. 
Sachs (1 98 1, 1983) examined fluctuations in the current account balances of LCD 
and OECD countries since 1960s. He approached the saving-investment relationship 
from a different perspective as compared to Feldstein and Horioka. Sachs regressed 
a cross-section of current account ratios on a cross-section of investment ratios and 
found that  slope coefficient was negative and  significantly different from zero. In 
addition he found significant inverse relationship between cross-section of changes in 
average  current  account  balances  and  changes in  investment  rates  over  various 
sample periods from 1968 through 1979. Based on these findings he concluded that 
investments are more closely correlated with changes in current account (i.e. implied 
foreign capital inflows) than with changes in savings. 
The investment-current account linkage reported by  Sachs encouraged number  of 
researchers to study the relationship between  savings, investment and the current 
account.  Caprio  and  Howard  (1984)  focused  on  medium  run  data  instead  of 
averaging the data over long period. The medium run was defined as a period from 
one business cycle to another. Observations of saving, investment and the balance on 
the current account for 23 OECD  countries were averaged of four business cycles in 
the period  of  1963-8  1 (subsamples were  1963-66,  1967-70,  197  1-74,  1975-8  1). 
Following equation was analyzed in order to avoid endogeneity problems; where CA is current account; S is the level  of national  savings; Y is the level of 
GDP; and  e is error term with  A  denoting the difference from cycle to cycle. The 
estimate of the  coefficient p for the  sample of  all  countries was  0.45 (with  s.e. 
0.1  15). They concluded that only about half of any change in  domestic savings was 
matched  by  changes in  domestic investment  in  the medium  run.  Contrary to  the 
conclusions of  Feldstein  and  Horioka and  others,  there is  a large degree of  net 
medium term consumption smoothing in the world economy. Caprio and  Howard 
repeated the regressions using the ratio of changes in the current account as a share 
of GDP to changes in  the investment rate. In  contrast to the results of Sachs they 
concluded  that  fluctuations in  savings  were  more  systematically associated with 
current account developments than were variations in  domestic investment rates. 
However,  Caprio  and  Howard  were  carefhl  to  point  out  that  their  conclusions 
differed from the Feldstein and Horioka study due to the use of changes in savings 
and investment over time. 
Penati and  Dooley (1984) confirmed the Feldstein and  Horioka results. They  also 
argued that the regression coefficients reported by  Sachs were heavily dependent on 
one or two outlying observations and the coefficients were sensitive to the choice of 
time periods. When  Sach's  equation was re-estimated without these  outliers,  an 
estimate of the slope coefficient was not significantly different fi-om zero. The period 
afier World War I1 was divided in their study into 5 subperiods. It was found that 
correlation between  the  cross-section  of changes in  saving  and  investment  rates 
appear to be high throughout the years. By contrast it was reported that the negative 
correlation between  the investment  and  current account takes a large value  only 
between 1968 and 1979, which indeed was the sample period used by  Sachs. 
It seems that the endogeneity problem is not the explanation for the high correlations 
since similar results are found when instrumental variables are used. This evidence is 
consistent  with  the view  that  changes  in  the  propensity  of  the  residents  of  an 
individual country to save is highly correlated with the country's investments. As a 
result  this  indicates  low  intertemporal  trade  between  countries  and,  hence, 
potentially  less  than  fully  efficient  consumption  smoothing.  In  other  words,  an 
increase in  investment opportunities will be financed less by  foreign capital inflows 
and more by domestic saving induced by an increase in home interest rates. 
3.4.2.1.2 Country Size Problem 
Econometric  critique  has  also  pointed  out  so  called  large  country  argument, 
according to which the inclusion of large industrialized countries in the sample may 
cause an upward bias in the estimated correlations between saving and investment. 
Tobin (1983) stated that Feldstein and Horioka one country tests implicitly assume 
that the country concerned is small. 
There are two versions of the country size effect. Harberger (1980) argued that as 
countries become larger, they become more diversified and  therefore the need  to 
borrow abroad declines in the case of asymmetric shock. Similarly, a regression of 
saving  on  investment  for  large  state  would  probably  reveal  that  most  saving remained within state borders. Atkeson (1 989) provides some evidence on this point. 
He examined the regional behavior of consumption and  output in  the US. Atkeson 
concluded that in  the time  span of  3 to 7 years,  there is a significant divergence 
between the growth rates of consumption and  output reflecting intertemporal trade 
across regions. However, the growth rates  of output and  consumption tended to 
convergence in the long run. 
If  domestic country is large  enough in  the  global  financial  markets then  foreign 
nominal interest rate, r*, is not exogenous with respect to saving and investment. In 
other words, an increase in national saving would lower the world interest rate and 
increase investment in that country. Saving and investment would thus be correlated 
although  perfect  capital  mobility  may  prevail.  However,  this  argument  can  not 
explain  the high  P in  cross-section  studies since  it  refers  to two  points in  time 
whereas in a cross-section study only the observations from one point in time are 
used (Dooley et al., 1987). Obstfeld (1986) examines the large country case in a time 
series context and  found  some evidence supporting it. However, it  can be  argued 
that there is only  one country that is large enough to affect on the world interest 
rates; namely the US. 
It appears that high correlations between national saving and investment are robust 
to the econometric critique raised in this section. 
3.4.2.2 Other Explanations 
There are also some conditions, under which the current account constraint alone 
implies that saving-investment ratios averaged over sufficiently long periods must be 
close despite  capital  mobility.36  In  principle, the former identity alone  places  no 
constraints on  the  average  difference between  saving  and  investment  rates.  Yet 
Obstfeld (1  994) considered the case in which there is steady-state ratio of net foreign 
assets to income from which the economy does not greatly diverge between the start 
and  end  of the sample period.  Then if  nominal  income growth is moderate,  the 
identity in the footnote 36, implies that the average difference between saving and 
investments rates may be small. Mature economies may  have attained a stationary 
distribution  of  the  foreign  assets1GDP  ratio;  the  intertemporal  gains  that  arise 
between  mature  economies  generally  will  be  transitory  and  their  distribution 
symmetrical. However,  even  this  explanation  does  not  shed  much  light  on  the 
36 TO  appreciate this point: If At is a country's nominal net foreign assets at the end of period t; the 
current account is A,-At-l = St - It. Define at = AtNt  as the ratio of external assets to income (Y), 
and gt = (Yt-Yt.1)Nt as the growth rate of nominal income. The difference between the averaged 
saving and investment rates is: 
yt-~t  --  ' i  At -  = [a  1  +  (I -  )  +  .-(+)ao]  -  - 
T  t=,  r,  T  t=l  r,  T observed short run links between saving and investment, because it is based  on the 
very long run co-movements of saving and investment. 
One easy way to explain the findings of saving and  investment  correlations  over 
time is to argue that Real Interest Parity does not hold  any better nowadays than it 
did in  the past. Frankel (1991) notes that the failure of the FH condition should be 
no surprise given the failure of the Real Interest Parity condition to hold. He studied 
real interest differentials in the 1980s for a panel of 25 countries: five closed LDCYs 
constituted  the  group  with  persistently  high  differentials whereas  for  five  open 
Atlantic countries the differentials were much more modest. Indeed no country had a 
real interest differential close to zero. However, according to Obstfeld (1995) this 
RIP mechanism may help us to understand the measured time series correlations but 
its value  in  cross-section  regressions  is  less  obvious. This  raises  the  interesting 
question  if  barriers  to  capital  mobility  are  so  low  among  major  industrialized 
countries, why  does it not show in real interest differentials? Frankel (1992) offers 
answer to the question: Even for those countries that exhibit no substantial country 
premia, as reflected in covered interest parities, there is  still potentially substantial 
currency premia that drive real interest differentials away from zero. 
If  the  failure  of the  Feldstein-Horioka  condition is  a  consequence of  persistent 
'currency  premia'  will  it  hold  within  a  common currency  area?  Recent  research 
supports  this  idea.  Bayoumi  and  Rose  (1993)  and  Sinn  (1992)  computed  the 
correlation of saving and investment across intranational regions. Sinn used data for 
all forty-eight US federal states and Alaska in  years  1953 and  1957. Bayoumi and 
Rose used the UK data from 1971 to 1985. Neither study found positive correlation 
between  saving  and  investment  rates.  Sinn  found  a  negative  cross-sectional 
relationship between saving and investment rates. Similarly, Bayoumi (1  990)  found 
no correlation among a set of countries during the gold-standard period. These all 
display those circumstances in which geographical units essentially share a common 
currency, suggesting that exchange-rate variability may be the source of high saving- 
investment correlations across the countries in the post-1973 period. These results 
indicate positive trade effects within the potential EMU  area and may be seen as a 
argument for the common currency. 
Another  attractive  explanation for  saving-investment  correlations is  provided  by 
Tesar (1991).  She noted that  disturbances to productivity  are not  only positively 
correlated over time, but also across countries. If the shocks were in fact aggregate 
individual  units  could  not  rely  on  international capital  markets  to  smooth  their 
consumption levels. Therefore savings and investment rates for individual countries 
as well as for the system as a whole would be positively correlated. 
To  summarize, this section has focused on the measures of economic integration of 
real  activity. It  seems that  international financial markets provide less than  hlly 
efficient risksharing.  The discussion of saving-investment correlations support the 
earlier  findings  in  2.2  that  national  markets  for  physical  capital  are  not  highly 
integrated and the degree of intertemporal trade is still persistently low. Although 
national markets for some types of financial capital are integrated they alone are not, sufficient  to  sustain  integration  of  national  markets  for  physical  capital  and 
consumption patterns. 
Implications for the  discussion  of  risksharing:  The lack  of  intertemporal trade  is 
associated with weakened  consumption smoothing possibilities. The high  saving- 
investment correlations seem to indicate that risks are not  shared efficiently in  the 
face of temporary country-specific shocks. On the other hand high saving-investment 
correlations  imply  that  the  marginal  productivity  of  capital  is  not  equalized 
internationally.  This  evidence  is  consistent  with  the  view  that  changes  in  the 
propensity to save of residents of an individual country are highly correlated with the 
country's investments. In other words, an increase in investment opportunities will 
be  financed less by  foreign capital inflows and more by  the domestic saving, which 
may indicate inefficient allocation of international investment resources. 
In the end of the day, the evidence from regional saving-investment regressions may 
be an indication that the prime suspect behind the cross-sectional saving-investment 
correlations is the policy of current account targeting. Several open questions in the 
EMU  context will  then  rise.  What  is  the  effect  of the  renunciation  of  the  CA 
targeting within  Europe:  in  particular  are investments allocated  and  risks  shared 
more efficiently? 
4 ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS 
In this chapter potential insurance arrangements that  serve as substitutes for non- 
existent private insurance markets are discussed in the context of the literature on 
incomplete  contracts.  The  discussion  moves  towards  the  'self-insurance' 
arrangements of individual agents (worker and  capitalist). Two arrangements are 
under discussion: Labor contracts and labor mobility. 
4.1 Insurance via Contracts and Institutions 
Although  the  outside  insurance  opportunities  are  limited  and  may  be  even 
inaccessable to  some  agents,  as  noted  in  the  previous  section,  there  are  still 
risksharing opportunities left. When the state of the world in the hture is uncertain 
and thus the consumption possibilities are also uncertain, contracts written will play 
two roles: allocation of resources from surplus agents to deficit ones (or from agents 
hit by  a positive shock to the units that suffer a negative shock) and allocation of 
risks. In this sense labor contracts could hnction as a risksharing device and, as a 
consequence,  even workers binding  constraints in  obtaining  credit  and  insurance 
could potentially be able to maintain smooth consumption levels. However, 'perfect 
hedging'  via  labor contracts is possible  only under perfect information conditions. 
Different  forms of labor  contracts and  reasons for the absence of efficient labor 
contracts are discussed next. 4.1.1  Labor Contracts 
The intuition underlying risksharing in labor market is the following: whenever risk- 
averse workers face uncertainty concerning their consumption possibilities which is 
due to the uncertainty about the fbture state of the world (St)  and they are not able to 
self-insure  against  such  income  risks  via  capital  markets3'  (or  migration  costs 
prohibitively high)  then  there  obviously is  an  incentive  for  insurance.  The wage 
contracts could then be written in ex ante to improve upon (in the Pareto sense) the 
spot  market  (according to  standard  neoclassical  perspective  any  departure  from 
competitive productivity-based  wage  structure is bound  to create welfare  losses). 
Spot  market  contracts  would  leave  individual  workers  to  bear  themselves  risk 
attached to their human-capital - risks which are notoriously difficult to diversify via 
'outside'  insurance market. However, in real world the private market is less likely 
to accommodate this  demand  for human-capital-related  risksharing.  This is a fact 
that is often attributed to problems of informational asymmetries or of writing and 
enforcing long-term  contracts. In what  follows,  two types  of labor  contracts  are 
discussed as potential  insurance devices. Throughout  the discussion  it  is assumed 
that capital markets are not performing their insurance fbnction efficiently. 
4.1.1.1 Rent-Sharing Labor Contracts 
A  situation in which  demand  shocks occur randomly is considered. The firm will 
design a remuneration package  that  will both  make it  money  and  attract  enough 
employees. If the firm is risk averse, it will wish the wage to rise in good times and 
to fall in bad times. In the situation of positive demand shock (boom) many workers 
are employed. In a slump some are laid off. Therefore from the basis of macroecomic 
indicators  there is  a  basis  for the  contractual  agreement  in  which  earnings  and 
unemployment are negatively related. These assumptions are consistent with a family 
of models  that  draw  on the concept  of rent-sharing  in  which  rents  are  divided 
between the employer and the workers. Next aprofit sharing contract is considered, 
which is a special case of rent-sharing contracts. 
The macroeconomic case for the profit sharing has been dominated by the works of 
Martin Weitzman (see e.g. Weitzman,  1983, 1985). He argued that when workers 
are  paid  fixed  wages  the  economy  automatically  behaves  inadequately.  That  is 
changes  in  demand  as  well  as  in  world  prices  generate  large  fluctuations  in 
employment. According to Weitzman this can be avoided by switching to a world in 
which workers'  wages  are tied  explicitly and  substantially to the profit  levels of 
employers. Then exogenous disturbances would merely alter wages and prices. 
37 Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993) estimated to which extent labor income fluctuations are insurable 
in existing capital markets. They estimated the following time-series regression AZKlt=al+dlAZKnt- 
~d2dl~lt+(l-d1-d2)~Klt  ,  where IK~~  is real per capita income from dividends, interests, and rents for 
state i in period t;  L,, is income from labor; and P,t is state product accruing to capital. In the data 
on the States of the US of 1966-86, the estimated coefficient of the change in per capita income 
from labor (-pd2)  was -0.013. When the regions were six members of the EU (Germany, France, the 
UK,  Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece) 1970-87, the coefficient of the change in per capita 
income from labor was -0.045. Both coefficients are far from minus one - indicating a near-total 
failure of insuring income risk in existing markets. The Weitzman solution is to make the payment  of the employee the sum of two 
components. First  there  is  a  base  wage  as paid  under  the  normal  remuneration 
system and second there is a profit-related component, which is some fraction of the 
per capita profit earned by  the company. The idea underlying the sharing economy is 
to ensure that base wage is low enough that firms will  be  unable to find  as many 
workers as they would  like - in this kind  of world  unemployment  disappears and 
indeed if the contingent remuneration system is efficient, firms would have much less 
incentive to sack workers in a slump. 
Although there are macroeconomic benefits generated by  the profit sharing scheme 
there are also microeconomic losses, if workers are supposed to be  risk  averse:38 
Sharing  programs  expose  workers  to  a  significant  amount  of  income  risk 
(BlancMower and  Oswald,  1987). The worker's  aversion to risk may  make fixed 
contracts optimal because risk  averse workers may  not be  willing to accept wage 
fluctuations and employed workers actually represent insiders who, in normal times, 
have relatively secure jobs and little interest in the level of employment. 
However, profit sharing contracts are not necessarily ruled out as risksharing device: 
Gottfries  and  Sjostrom  (1995)  considered  profit  sharing  contract  between  risk 
neutral firm (or the owners are assumed to be able to divers@ fully their risks in the 
capital markets) and risk averse worker under product demand uncertainty. Indeed 
their solution is a profit sharing mechanism that avoids inefficient layoffs while at the 
same time stabilizing incomes of the workers (i.e. the efficient distribution of risk). 
The authors considered a non-linear profit sharing contract, in which the wage was 
given by: 
where B is  the base wage; H(@  is the total bonus component distributed to the 
workers; ~r  denotes profits before payments to shareholders (n  = R - Bl where R is 
revenue; and  I is employment). It was proved that the allocation resulting from an 
efficient  state  contingent  contract  (studied  in  2.1)  can  be  replicated  also  by  an 
incentive-compatible contract with a profit  sharing clause as defined  above. Next 
efficient state contingent contracts between labor and capital owners will be analyzed 
more thoroughly. 
Their analysis of profit sharing is usehl if the following assumptions hold: 
i) Workers have bargaining power, so that the wage exceeds the reservation wage, 
ii)  employed  workers  are  threatened  by  layoffs,  iii)  unemployment  insurance  is 
imperfect, iv) demand or productivity is uncertain and workers are risk averse and v) 
profits are observable and highly correlated with shocks to the marginal product of 
labor. Each of these conditions is not only sufficient but also necessary. If one of the 
conditions i)  - v)  does  not  hold  then  there  is  clearly  incentives  for  fixed-wage 
contract. 
- - - 
38 Actually, it was originally assumed in 2.1 that agents are risk averse. However,  Gottfries  and  Sjostrom (1995) did  not  discuss the effects  on workers' 
incentives nor those of profit  sharing schemes on investments. However, a sharing 
system affects firm's investments. As Wadhwani (1987) pointed out the firm would 
be forced to surrender a proportion of the resulting value added to the wage earners 
and would therefore be less likely to invest.39  In addition this could cause a conflict 
of interest between employers and  employees, with workers being in favor of any 
investment that would add anything to the value of the output of the firm. On the 
other  hand  there  are  doubts  of  the  effects  of  profit  sharing  on  the  level  of 
employment,  because  insiders  may  resist  the  employing  additional  workers  if  it 
means income cuts for them. 
Existing empirical literature on profit sharing provides some, albeit a diverse picture 
of the feasibility of profit sharing. Some authors have tried to estimate employment 
effects of profit sharing: 
BlancMower and Oswald (1988) found that in the UK,  profit  sharing is relatively 
common in  the highly volatile mineral and chemical industries.  Their  observations 
support the idea that profit sharing contracts are used to protect jobs when workers 
are worried  about layoffs. Estrin  and  Wilson  (1986)  studied  52 firms in  the UK 
engineering  and  metal  industries  over  the  period  1978-  1982.  The  geographic 
concentration of these industries is in the West Midlands and West Yorkshire. They 
found that the introduction of profit sharing increased employment in their sample of 
firms by  approximately  13 percent.  In addition,  total remuneration  in  firms  with 
profit  sharing was found on average to be 4 per cent lower than in firms without 
profit sharing. However, as warned by the authors themselves their results were only 
preliminary. Jones and Pliskin (1989) examined a sample of British firms with-diverse 
sharing arrangements in order to study the effects of profit sharing on employment 
levels. When profit sharing was captured by  a dummy variable the results indicated 
that profit sharing firms had significantly lower employment levels than conventional 
fixed-wage firms. When the participation variable was omitted, the results indicated 
that employment is 33 percent lower in profit  sharing firms in the long run. When 
continuous measure  of profit  sharing was used,  the employment  effects typically 
ranged fkom -6 per cent to 6 per cent, which are much modest than those obtained 
by Estrin and Wilson (1  986). 
In general, theoretical implications as well some empirical results suggest that profit 
sharing  schemes  may  be  applicable  to many  (not  only worker-firm)  buyer-seller 
relationships,  where  one or both parties  are risk  averse. Although,  there  may  be 
observability, agency and incentive problems profit sharing contracts are sometimes 
feasible. 
39 TO  appreciate this: Profit sharing firm maximizes max IF(K,L,J - 8L - pKJ- s/F'p,L) - 8L - iD1, 
K,L 
where F(K, L) is standard production function; K is capital stock; L is labour; 6 is base wage; p is 
average cost of capital; s is a share of accounting profits (after interest); i is rate of interest on debt; 
and D is debt. It  assumed that i=p. Maximizing yields: FL(K, L) = 6and Ffl,  L)  = p/ (1 - s). 
Since, under profit sharing FK > p  =MPK  (in the absence of profit sharing) the level of the capital 
stock is reduced. 4.1.1.2 Implicit Labor Contracts 
Eichengreen (1  990) noted that owners of human capital cannot diversifl their human 
capital  portfolios because  of bilocation  and  because  adverse  selection and  moral 
hazard  problems make  efficient  contracts between  individuals of different  region 
infeasible. However, Dreze and Gollier (1993) pointed out that, in particular, close 
contracts4'  and  vested  interests  entailed  by  the  employment  relationship  offer 
prospects for overcoming the obstacles (transaction costs, information asymmetries 
and  moral hazard) which  stand in  the way  of 'anonymous and  outside'  insurance 
market. Still, in real world workers are not (yet) covered by  long-term contracts and 
they bear their own risks hlly. This is actually the starting point  of the theory of 
implicit labor contracts (see Rosen, 1985 for survey on the topic). 
A Pareto-efficient labor contract arrangement, which replicates the allocation with a 
complete set of insurance arrangements is  studied next. The analysis follows the 
presentation of Dreze and Gollier (1 993) and is actually only one variant of complete 
consumption insurance, which was studied in 2.1. However, it permits a discussion 
of long-term risksharing  and  implementation of risksharing  contracts between the 
owners  of  physical  capital  and  workers  within  given  efficient  risksharing 
arrangements do not necessarily respect national boundaries. 
There are S'  mutually  exclusive states of the world  at time t  and  the production 
possibilities  are  state  dependent  f,,  (L,,)  ,  Ls,  is  labor  input  in  state 9. The 
probability of state S' is  The labor demand in state S from first order condition 
is: 
There is a homogeneous population of N workers each of which supplies one unit of 
labor at all wages Ws>  m,  where m denotes the opportunity cost of employment. 
The competitive wage is then defined by 
Unrestricted risksharing possibilities are introduced via  state-dependent lump-sum 
transfers41: to capitalist (As),  employed  worker  (a,) or unemployed  worker  (b,). 
Consumption possibilities of agents are thus defined by: 
(i)  aggregate net profits: 7ts  =f,(LJ - wJs  + A, 
(ii)  income of an employed worker: W, + a, 
40 However, Deaton (1992) pointed out that there is monitoring problem even in small families in 
which there are problems associated with protecting everyone against all the consequences of their 
own actions. 
41 It is worth of noting that all the taxes, transfers or allowances under consideration are 
instruments of risksharing, not of redistribution. (iii) benefits of an unemployed worker: b, 
Following budget identity must be satisfied: 
A,  -t L#$  + (N-LJb,  = 0 
It is assumed that state-distribution of net profits P, taking the value P,  in state s is 
valued uniquely in asset markets and this value can be represented as 
v(P,,...,Ps)  = C  nsg(<)  = ~,g(p),  g7>0,  gW<o 
S 




Pareto  efficient allocation  (L~  ,  W,  ,a,,  bsl ,  As,)st  for  this  problem  is  a  feasible 
allocation that satisfies the following conditions 
(9  for each$  Wy  = wS' 
(ii)  for each d  with Lst < N,  b,.  = a, 
(iii)  for each pair St, st": 
-+a,)  - g'(pst)  - 
ut (w++]  -  m  +  ay.1 )  g (pp1  ) 
In short risksharing arrangement between workers and  capitalists discussed above 
sustain similar conclusions that were drawn in section 2.1 (i.e. risksharing efficiency 
requires that the marginal rate of substitution between any pair of state contingent 
payoffs be equal for all members of a group) and lump-sum transfers are used as a 
tool to arrange efficient risksharing between workers and firms characterized by  a 
common marginal rate of substitution between  consumption  in  states t  and  t+l. 
However, it should be kept in mind that when shocks are aggregate the rationale for 
insurance disappears, and the adjustment at the macrolevel is called for. 
How  to  implement?  It  may  be  difficult  (yet  not  necessarily impossible)  for  an 
individual region or an individual 'firm'  to offer this type of insurance to workers; 
states of the world may obtain in which it is not incentive-compatible to comply the 
terms  of the  contract.  Indeed,  one  of the  most  pervarsive  criticism  of  implicit 
contracts is the possibility of ex post renegotiation. Ex post, parties to the contract 
may  perceive they are paying more than their actuarially fair share or may  find  it 
opportune to skip out on the system. As is well-known  from the principal-agent 
literature optimal incentive contracts tend to be too complicated to be applied to 
42 Workers are endowed with the cardinal utility function for net income. real-world problems. Regarding the properties an  optimal transfer payment  should 
possess, even such a simple property as monotonicity cannot be guaranteed without 
very strong assumptions (see Grossman and Hart, 1983). 
And  is it  even possible to discuss institutions which might be  able to enforce the 
terms of contracts expost? Actually, there is need for a social planner (government), 
or a labor union in some cases, to organize state-dependent transfers. However, this 
requires acceptance of instruments that are not commonly used (like negative tax on 
wage income). 
Another  source  of  discrepancy  between  the  model  and  reality  is  imperfect 
information. Wages should react to systematic disturbances, but it may be impossible 
to identifjr  systematic  shocks  exactly  because  of  their  inherently  random  nature. 
Additional information is  needed  to infer  the  exact  nature  of  the  shocks before 
necessary steps are taken. A more intriguing variation on this theme appears when 
information  is  asymmetric.  It  may  be  the  case  that  the  shock  itself  is  private 
information. Consider a situation where there are two states of the world: 'good' 
and  'bad'.  Shock can be  systematic or idiosyncratic. In the case of  'bady shocks 
individuals have an incentive to represent  shocks as idiosyncratic ones in  order to 
obtain  compensation.  Good  shocks  will  always  be  represented  as  systematic, 
possibly leading to wage increases . 
Actually, it seems that first best contracts are not a feature of the real world and, 
especially in  Europe,  second best  Pareto efficient 'wage rigidity insurance models' 
hold in the solidaristic Rawlsian spirit.43  However, the standard interpretation is that 
wage rigidities are due to labor union activities aimed at increasing either the labor 
share in national income (Dreze and Bean, 1990) or the income of employed workers 
(Lindbeck  and  Snower,  1988). However,  one problem with  rigid  wages in  most 
actual labor contracts is the short length, usually fiom one to three years,  of these 
contracts.  This  contract  length  is,  indeed,  extremely  short,  and,  hence,  these 
contracts are not effective in reducing long-run risks. In addition, with rigid wages 
adjustment to market conditions comes through layoffs. 
In addition, Attanasio and  Davis (1994) carried out formal tests  of consumption 
insurance and  characterized the impact of systematic relative wage movements on 
consumption distribution in the US during the 1980s. Their results on the magnitude 
of the covariance between relative wages and consumption can be  considered as a 
sharp rejection of consumption insurance hypothesis. This can be  seen as extreme 
evidence  of  the  non-existence  of  suitable  mechanisms  for  enforcing  risksharing 
agreements that are Pareto improving ex ante, and the infeasibility of characterizing 
complete risksharing contracts. 
43 The wage insurance function of unions can be interpreted as attributing expost income and wage 
inequality to ex ante insurable risk (see Rawls (1971) who defined justice by reference to 
preferences given unknown initial endowments). 4.2 Self-Insurance Mechanism of Labor Mobility 
Labor mobility is often involved as an adjustment tool for asymmetric shocks. It is 
often  stated  that  if  workers  were  extremely  mobile,  migrating  or  changing 
occupational  status  whenever  shocks  hit  their  region  of  residence,  or  industry 
differences in regional gross domestic product per capita would not last for long. On 
the other hand  labor mobility should also be  considered  as an agent-specific  self- 
insurance arrangement and in the world of perfect mobility there would not be any 
'external'  insurance demand. However, the real world is not  as straightforward as 
one would like to think. The relevance of labor mobility as an adjustment mechanism 
against idiosyncratic shocks is the topic of this section. 
4.2.1 Labor Migration 
Recent  efforts  to create  the  Single European  Market  have  reduced  barriers  to 
international  (or  indeed  inter-regional)  labor  mobility  in  Europe.  Citizens  of the 
European Union are now granted residency and work permits to all members states. 
Although a home market bias in the locational preferences is surely easier to detect 
than  the  corresponding  bias  in  consumption  patterns  and  in  portfolio  allocation 
policy-makers in European countries, however, typically have complained about the 
low level  of labor  mobility within Europe because enchanced  factor mobility  has 
been seen as an essential precondition for European regions to adjust to idiosyncratic 
shocks. 
Decressin  and  Fatas  (1995) investigated  regional  labor  market  dynamics both  in 
Europe and in the US in similar framework as was originally done by Blanchard and 
Katz (1992)"  They focused on regions in ~uro~e~'  instead of countries in order to 
analyze regional dynamics caused by idiosyncratic shocks. First, the extent to which 
employment growth rates are idiosyncratic in European regions and in the US was 
studied. The following regression equation was estimated  in order to analyze this 
question: 
where Nit is employment in region (state) i in period t; Net  is aggregate employment 
in Europe (the US).  It was found that in the US 40 percent  of the dynamics in 
employment growth rates are state-specific, whereas in Europe region-specific effect 
amount  to  80  percent.  Even  after  controlling  for  different  country-specific 
macroeconomic policies using country-specific time dummies still about 50 percent 
of employment growth rates were region-specific. 
44 Blanchard and Katz concluded that in the US employment typically bears the task of regional 
adjustment . A negative disturbance that lowers employment in a given state produces relatively 
little real wage response, but the labour market regains equilibrium as the excess labour moves to 
new location within the US. 
45 Sample contained total of 5  1 regions: 8 for France, 8 for Germany, 11 for Italy, 7 for Spain, 1  1 
for the UK.  Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal were treated as 
single regions. Next  it was  studied how quickly the employment rate in  a region  returned to its 
mean level once the region had  experienced an  adverse shock. Authors concluded 
that deviations of regional relative unemployment rates from their long-term means 
are not persistent in Europe or in the US. The differences in relative unemployment 
rates between regions seemed to be more persistent in Europe than in the US. This in 
turn implies that regional  employment shocks may  not be  absorbed by  changes in 
regional unemployment  rates. However,  as far  as the  magnitude  of the  long-run 
effects  of  the  shocks  and  the  short-run  adjustment  mechanism  those  shocks 
triggered, the evidence for Europe and the US differed noticeably. 
The joint  behavior  of  regional  relative  employment,  relative  unemployment  and 
relative  participation  rates  was  analyzed  in  order  to  capture  how  shocks  were 
absorbed  in  Europe;  to  the  extent  that  regional  labor  demand  shocks  are  not 
reflected in  unemployment or labor force participation rates they must be absorbed 
by inter-regional migration. The estimated system was following: 
where  nit  = log(n,J - Pilog(NeJ;  eit = log(E,J - Silog(EeJ;  and Pir  = log(P,J - 
{,log(P,J. Where nit is regional  relative to EEC wide employment, eit is regional 
relative to EEC wide employment rate, E, is  regional employment rate and E, is 
European  employment  rate;  pit  is  regional  relative  to  EEC  wide  labor  force 
participation rate, Pi  is regional labor force participation rate and P, is European 
labor force participation rate. 
The results indicated that in response to a positive regional labor demand shock in 
Europe it takes roughly 3 years for the effect on the labor force participation rate 
and 4 years for the effect on the unemployment rate to disappear. In the first year 
virtually 100 percent of the increase in employment in response to the initial shocks 
is reflected in an increase of the participation and employment rates, in  second year 
73 percent, in third 55 percent and in fourth 20 percent. Thus after the third year net 
immigration amounts to a  substantial insurance  device to the  shock. In  the  US 
immigration plays  the most  important  role in  the  adjustment  from the  first  year 
onwards when net immigration accounts for 52 percent of the increase in regional 
employment. Reverse holds  for  regional  labor  force  participation: in  Europe  its 
increase accounts for 78 percent of the rise in employment in the first year and 50 
percent in the second whereas for the US  figures are  18 percent and  17 percent, 
respectively. These US results are consistent with the findings of Blachard and Katz 
(1992) that the rapid  return  occurs because labor force participants migrate into 
states which have experienced a favorable demand shock. 
In addition, Bayoumi and Prasad (1995) studied, both in the US and in 8 European 
countries,  labor  market  adjustment  regional  shocks  (i.e.  shocks  that  affect  all 
industries within a given region or country), industrial shocks (i.e. shocks that affect industries across all  regions or  countries) and  aggregate shocks (i.e. shocks that 
affect all regions or countries and all industries simultaneously). European countries 
were  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Greece,  Italy,  Netherlands  and  the 
United Kingdom. The US data was from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
regional data bank and the European data was taken from OECD National Accounts. 
Real  output  data  was  converted  into  US  dollars  using  1985 purchasing  power 
parities. 
Authors focused on the degree of integration and nature of labor market adjustment 
by  considering the  determinants  of  long-term trends in  output,  employment  and 
productivity. These trends were decomposed into sectoral and regional components. 
Productivity regressions can be  seen as a measure of integration of labor markets, 
because if the labor markets are highly integrated across regions (countries) then the 
levels of  productivity should be independent of regional effects and reflect instead 
industry-specific effects. The employment regressions, on the other hand can be seen 
as a measure of how the labor market adjustment that does occur is indeed achieved. 
The relative importance of regional and industrial disturbances in employment trends 
indicate the  degree to which  labor  market  equilibrate through  firms  moving  to 
regions of excess labor supply (region(country)-specific effects) or labor moving to 
expanding industries (industry-specific effects). 
The econometric approach was to estimate the following equation for each of the 
relevant variables (level of productivity and rate of growth of output, employment, 
and productivity): 
where ZnAz,, is the change in the logarithm of output in industry i in region (country) 
j;  a, represents the  effects of a  shock to industry i relative to the  shock to the 
industry which was excluded from the estimation; P, represents the effects of a shock 
to region (country) j  relative to the excluded region (country); and ~;j  is an error 
term.  Since the  empirical  specification assumes that  industry-specific and  region 
(country)-specific dummies are orthogonal, the explanatory power of these variables 
can be  calculated from the reduction in the R~ statistic caused by  excluding them 
from original regression. 
The results of Bayoumi and Prasad  also indicate that there is major difference in 
labor market adjustment between the US  and  the European countries. In the US 
productivity trends are dominated by  industry-specific factors. Of the 97 percent of 
variation  explained  by  the  regression  for  productivity  levels,  industrial  dummy 
variables accounted for  94  percentage  points,  regional  dummy  variables  only  2 
percentage points, with remaining 1 percentage point being unallocatable; Of the 89 
percent explained by the regression for productivity growth, the contribution of the 
industry  and  regional  dummy  was  83  percentage points  and  1 percentage  point 
respectively. In Europe productivity trends are more dominated by  country-specific factors.46  Of the 75 percent of variation explained by  the regression for productivity 
levels, the industry  dummy  accounted  for only 50 percentage  points  and  country 
dummy  variable  for  25  percentage  points;  Of  the  83  percent  explained  by  the 
regression  of productivity  growth, the contributions  of the industrial and  country 
dummy was 19 percentage points and 64 percentage point respectively. This in turn 
says that the US labor market is more integrated than the European labor market  - 
potentially because of single currency. 
The employment  growth regressions  in  the  US  indicated  an  increasing  (yet  still 
secondary) role for regional factors. Of the 89 percent  explained by  the regression 
for  employment,  the  contribution  of  the  industry  and  regional  dummy  was  63 
percentage  points  and  24  percentage  point  respectively. One implication of these 
regressions is that for most  part  economic  adjustment comes from movements of 
labor  to regions with  expanding  industries,  rather  than  movements  of expanding 
industries to regions with excess labor force. This result is consistent with those of 
Blanchard and Katz (1992) and it appears to be the predominant  form of regional 
adjustment in the US. 
The employment regressions in European countries, on the other hand, indicated that 
country-specific factors play a very small role in explaining differences in long-term 
employment growth (of the 69 percent of explained by the employment regression, 
the contribution of the industry and regional dummy was 61 percentage points and 8 
percentage  points  respectively).  However,  because the productivity  regressions in 
Europe indicated a low degree of labor market integration, the interpretation of these 
results is that, from the point of view of insurance, inter-sectoral reallocation of labor 
appears to be quite important within but not, however, across European countries. 
To  sum  up: Original findings of Blanchard  and  Katz (1992)  indicated  that  inter- 
regional labor flows are important an adjustment mechanism in the US labor market; 
these results were confirmed by both Decressin and Fatas (1995) and Bayoumi and 
Prassad (1995). Although labor mobility in the US is considerable it indeed involves 
long lags, so that labor mobility alone cannot be seen as an effective self-insurance 
device against temporary adverse shocks. In addition  the results of Decressin and 
Fatas (1995) indicated that the lag in Europe is indeed longer than in the US and 
especially region-specific  shocks in  particular  are met  by  changes  in  labor  force 
participation. 
46  There is no clear concensus between economists whether the country- or industry-specific shocks 
will be the dominant ones in Europe. Krugman (1993) argued that EMU could lead to regional 
specialization and hence there would be more regional unemployment problems. However, it is 
possible to argue that the common market lets the EU countries become more similar. Hence, future 
shocks in a monetary union should be symmetric rather than asymmetric (Cohen and Wyplosz, 
1989). Ahonen and Pyyhtia (1996) and also Kajaste (1993) found tendencies in the Finnish 
economy that support this view. One such tendency is the increasing convergence of the structure of 
Finnish exports to that of other EU countries. Another important factor reducing the traditional 
asymmetry of the Finnish economy is diversification of the structure of output key sectors of the 
economy (forest and the metal and engineering industries). It  seems obvious that  the introduction of the common  currency will  contribute to 
labor  mobility  in  Europe in  response to  asymmetric  shocks: it  will  be  easier  to 
compare real wage differentials and thus influate migration4'  However, some open 
question appear immediately: is migration socially efficient i.e. do private and social 
costs  and  benefits  from  migration  balance.  This  question  may  even  explain  the 
observed lags in migration: as was argued in 3.2 there is a tendency for households 
to invest in real estates, so that if housing markets are not sufficient liquid there is an 
incentive  for  owners  to  stay  (assuming  of  course that  the  unit  is  not  liquidity 
constrained and therefore not forced to leave region). One should also keep in mind 
that there may be households whose single adult belongs to labor force. 
Actually, Burda  (1993) studied  the determinants  of East-West  German  migration 
using the concept of the 'option value of waiting', in which the decision to be taken 
is characterized by i) a fixed cost that is to some extent unrecoverable, ii) underlying 
uninsurable uncertainty that is revealed over time and iii) an option to wait, that is, to 
postpone the decision and fixed cost incurred to some later date. Under conditions of 
certainty48  a worker migrates when 
where Sis  the discount rate; p  is the drift term (expected rate of wage convergence); 
and f  is the net one-time cost of migration. 
Preliminary results suggested that the age (captured largely by the discount rate 6) 
was  strongly  negatively  associated  with  the  desire  to  migrate.  Second,  wage 
increases did not appear to affect migration decisions implying that migration costs 
u>  are substantial4'  and  perceived  future uncertainty  is high.  Another  significant 
predictor  of migration  intention  was the level of rents  - lower rents  implied  less 
mobility. Migration intentions of the inhabitants of small towns and medium sized 
cities potentially implied relatively gloomy prospects available there. However, the 
role of uncertainty  seems to be two-sided:  while increases in uncertainty  raise the 
option  value  of waiting  (or  the opportunity  cost  of exercising  the option),  risk 
aversion  on the part  of the agents may  encourage  migration  as  a  risk  reduction 
measure. 
An  important  related  issue  here  is  whether  labor  mobility  will  be  sufficient  to 
promote competition among jurisdictions  and lead  to local public  goods financed 
solely by benefit taxation or user charges (Tiebout,  1956). As noted by Burda and 
47 Economic theory predicts that labour flows are affected by  differences in marginal productivity. 
Fischer and Parviainen (1994) studied this pattern in European labour markets in 1970s and 1980s. 
They concluded that the explanatory power of marginal productivity differentials is very limited 
and that labor mobility within Europe has remained low. Similarly Faini and Venturi (1994) 
pointed out that often in the presence of large and persistent wage differentials, the rate of 
migration can be very low. However, the theory of option value of waiting can contribute to 
explaining the persistence of large wage differences across regions. 
48 Wage differential w,  = (WW- @)/ fl  follows the process Amt = -p + v, (for fit>  @J under 
conditions of certainty  vt = 0 for t20. 
49 Not only monetary costs but also psychological and social ones. Wyplosz  (1992) in  the East-West European  context the most  likely  migrants  are 
young, educated, and mobile workers; similar evidence on the effects of migration in 
the US labor markets was found by  Greenwood (1975). In addition, economic and 
demographic studies indicate that, well into the next century, Europe may not suffer 
from aggregate labor shortage but that growth in labor demand will be biased toward 
relatively high  skills (Faini and  Venturi,  1993). Thus migration can  be  considered 
beneficial for the receiving country - because of the positive selection of qualities 
necessary to succeed abroad. This 'brain drain' migration in turn may have negative 
effects for capital formation and economic development on the country losing skilled 
workers. From  the  perspective of  this  argument migration  may  constrain  taxing 
potential of local governments and induce some pressure on the harmonization of the 
income taxes in order to avoid fiscal competition and disadvantageous 'brain flows'. 
Hence, if these considerations should be taken seriously, there are hrther restrictions 
on the effectiveness of local fiscal policy. 
4.2.1.1 Inter-relationship Between Mobility of Labor, Capital and Trade 
Interesting  question here  is  whether  there  are  in  Europe,  some  other  insurance 
mechanism,  like that potentially provided by  inter-regional capital mobility,  which 
might  substitute adequately for limited labor mobility  in  Europe in  order to bring 
regional unemployment rates back into line. Fischer and Parviainen (1994) studied 
the relationhip between labor and capital flows by  comparing signs of long, 10-years, 
averages of capital  account balances  and  net  migration. It was found that in  the 
1970s the  capital  and  labor  flows  were  complementary,  but  in  the  1980s the 
relationship seem  to have  changed: In  Belgium,  Germany,  Ireland,  Luxembourg, 
Portugal,  and  Switzerland  the  data  suggests  substitution,  with  Ireland  and 
Switzerland experiencing the strongest change. Only in Finland an opposite shift to 
complementarity took  place.  In Austria,  Denmark, France,  Greece, Norway,  and 
Sweden net balances of labor and capital flows showed the same signs. 
4.2.2 Occupational Mobility 
Occupational mobility is an insurance device against sector-specific as well as agent- 
specific disturbances and therefore mobility across regions is not necessarily needed 
in  order to cushion the  effects of adverse shock. McGoldrick  and  Robst  (1996) 
estimated a simultaneous equations system in which both wages and worker mobility 
were  endogenous  to  examine  whether  workers  facing  greater  uncertainty  were 
susceptible to greater  mobility.  The  data  was  from  the  Panel  Study  of  Income 
Dynamics  covered  the  period  1979-1984.  Income  risk  was  measured  as  the 
coefficient variation in  annual income, where the numerator equaled the  standard 
error of the residual from regressing income on time for each individual. Mobility 
was measured  as the predicted value  of a probit  model  where the probability  of 
changing jobs measured over the 1979-  1984 time period was the dependent variable. 
While risk averse workers were assumed to prefer stable income growth, the extent 
to which  they  will  accept  income  uncertainty  can  be  offset by  worker  mobility. 
Workers were assumed to maximize utility U = UW,R,M,X), where W is worker's wages over time; R is the measure of uncertainty; M is the degree of mobility; and X 
is a vector of non-wage job characteristics. 
It was found that the probability of moving decreases with experience and length of 
time with the same employer. Both men and women with union status jobs were less 
likely to change jobs.  When compared across categories of education it was found 
that the average predicted probability of changing jobs increased with education up 
to the highest education classes. Indeed, results indicated that workers facing more 
uncertainty displayed higher mobility, which is consistent  with conventional model 
predictions. 
De New  and  Zimmermann (1996)  studied  the  effects  of trade  and  migration  on 
occupational  mobility. The data used  the first  9 waves  (for  1984 -  1992) of the 
German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) for west Germany. Mobility was measured in 
terms  of occupational  changes  of at  the  level  corresponding  to  one-digit  ISCO 
(International  Standard Classification of Occupations from the LO) code and at a 
more  disaggregated  three-digit  level,  for intra-firm  and  inter-firm  changes  of the 
workplace.  The  Probit  models0 was  estimated  to  derive  probability  estimate  of 
individual mobility. 
Authors found that age had a negative effect on occupational and inter-firm mobility, 
and  education  displayed  U-shaped  relationship.  Somehow  surprisingly,  regional 
unemployment  and  industry  growth were hardly  significant  at  all,  but  the union 
density had  a negative effect on occupational mobility and inter-firm  changes. An 
increase in trade deficit ratios1 implied an increase in inter-firm mobility for skilled 
worker except for low-experienced  workers. Occupational mobility was influenced 
more negatively for less-skilled workers and longer experience. 
Indeed it seems that young and those with average education are more willing to 
insure  themselves  by  the  means  of occupational  and  inter-firm  mobility  if  it  is 
assumed  that  increase  in  trade  deficit  (relative  increase  in  imports)  indicates 
increased competition or more strongly negative demand shock for industry within 
Germany. 
To  summarize,  it  seems  that  the  importance  of  labor  mobility  as  an  insurance 
arrangement  against  temporary,  short-run  fluctuations  is  either  neglible  or 
economically fairly  unimportant  in Europe and  the  Especially  in  culturally 
diversified Europe it is difficult to imagine massive labor flows although the legal 
restrictions  are removed  and,  hence,  regional  labor  market  segmentation  can  be 
persistent. Indeed,  if increased  labor mobility is a desirable feature of a monetary 
union to cope with permanent,  long run shocks,  then investments  in education  is 
needed  in order to promote interregional labor  mobility. On the other hand,  one 
problem with job mobility is one's  ability to change occupational status or from the 
The Probit model has a dichotomuous variables as the dependent variable (change1 no change). 
51 The 'Trade Deficit Ratio' was calculated as (Imports - Exports) I Output, where the real 
Deutschmark value of exports, imports and gross value added out by  industry and year were used. 
52 Fact that is confused badly in the literature on 'optimum currency areas'. perspective of firm, matching of individual worker to specific tasks. In short, neither 
labor  migration  nor  occupational  mobility  appear  to  be  efficient  insurance 
arrangements  in  large  scale,  although  they  may  well  be  welfare  improving 
arrangements at an individual level. 
5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
So far it has been concluded that the conditions for complete consumption insurance 
are in  reality oRen not fulfilled. In the international context the main implication of 
this  conclusion is  that  individuals are unable  to  diversify  their  income  risks via 
existing capital  markets  and  other  arrangements. This  means  that  agents  cannot 
protect themselves from regional, country-specific shocks. On the other hand - as the 
discussion so far has  emphasized  - the various member  countries of the European 
Union are generally severely restricted in their pursuit of independent fiscal policies. 
This implies limitations to their potential to protect individual citizens from country- 
specific or other idiosyncratic income fluctuations. This is the basic motivation for 
the discussion of policy implications of prevailing incomplete insurance mechanism in 
this chapter, first in  the EMU  context and  then in  the more general  'world-wide 
frame' . 
5.1 Discussion on Fiscal Federalism 
A long tradition in the existing literature on fiscal federalism has presented  several 
arguments in  favor  of  relatively  large jurisdictions  (or  nations,  countries).  Two 
arguments rely  on the  public  good  aspect: there  are  economics of  scale in  the 
production  of public  goods in  large jurisdictions  (see e.g. Casella  and  Feinstein, 
1990) and  externalities that lead  to tax  competition can be  internalized (see e.g. 
Epple  and  Romer,  1991). The  literature  on  public  redistribution  presents  two 
additional  arguments:  A  large  redistributive  system  can  offer  insurance  against 
region- or country-specific shocks and if redistribution has a public good aspect then 
there will be too little of it in fragmented jurisdictions (assuming that taxpayers care 
about welfare of each others) (see e.g. Brown  and  Oates,  1987). However,  the 
purpose here is not to provided survey of issues concerning the fiscal dimension of 
EMU,  but  instead  provide  some  selective views  from the  point  of view  of  the 
insurance arrangements. 
Role for federal government intervention through the federal transfer system can be 
justified  if insurance cannot be provided by  the market or if insurance provided by 
the federal government is more efficient than market-based insurance, or if central 
governments has better and  more efficient access to insurance markets than local 
government.53  As  argued  above in 3.3 the flexibility  of national  fiscal  policies is 
likely to restricted  by  debt  and  deficit  criteria  as well  as by  market  based  fiscal 
discipline in the context of the series of adverse shocks or permanent shock, which 
implies that EU countries may  not be able to self-insure themselves against severe 
53 SO  called Subsidiarity Principle: Policy decision should not be taken centrally if it can be carried 
out equally efficiently at a local level. However, when a particular task is allocated to a particular 
level it is also necessary to consider spillover effects to other regions and other areas of policy. macroeconomic  shocks.  Thus  a  lack  of  insurance  can  contribute  to  increased 
aggregate  volatility,  which  seems  to  aggravate  problems  of  macroeconomic 
misalignments. This provides the motivation  for the discussion on advantages and 
disadvantages of federal fiscal policy. 
5.1.1 Insurance Mechanism of Federal Fiscal Policy 
Some authors have argued strongly that EU-wide tax and transfer system would be 
desirable in order to cushion regional shocks. Proponents of this point of view agree 
that any Union mechanism would have to be as automatic and invisible as possible 
that its purpose would not be to equalize income levels but rather provide insurance 
against country-specific shocks. Federal fiscal insurance that  sustain improved risk- 
sharing in an equilibrium under asymmetric regional shocks can be achieved through 
a union wide tax and transfer  system. The system would  have to be designed in a 
way  that  distributes  lower  taxes  to  relatively  depressed  regions  and  higher  to 
booming oness4  (e.g. progressive income taxation). However, it should keep in mind 
that the degree of risksharing arrangement  achieved  by  taxes and transfers is not 
generally optimal: tax component represents incomplete risksharing and the transfer 
component is limited to extreme cases (Shiller, 1993). 
It is possible  to argue that  a  federal  stabilization  policy is more  effective than  a 
regional one, if consumers are partially Ricardian (see the discussion in 3.3). For this 
to correspond to insurance, the shocks should be as likely to affect one country as 
another,  so  that  ex  ante  there  is  no  presumption  of  being  gainer  or  loser 
(Masson, 1996). 
5.1.1.1 Evidence from Existing Federations 
It is argued that a comparison of fiscal transfers within the existing federations (the 
US  and  Canada)  provide  interesting  lessons  for  the  potential  role  of  'federal 
insurance'  within EU states. However, it should  be kept  in mind  that there is no 
particular  reason  to  assume  that  the  existing  'models'  provide  the  appropriate 
'blueprint'  for an integrated Europe. 
Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) pointed  out that the US is a currency union where 
the system of federal  taxes  and  transfers  provides  a  effective  shock-absorber for 
variations  in  regional  incomes.  Sala-i-Martin and  Sachs investigated  the extent  of 
federal insurance in the nine census regions of the US over the period  1970-88. They 
calculated  the  contribution  of  the  tax  and  transfer  system  using  the  following 
estimated 'regional'  elasticities: 
ATX  I TX  ATR I  TR 
'TX  =  AY  1 Y  and',=  Ay/Y  ' 
54 That is federal tax rate, indeed, is non-state contingent but the tax revenues that encompass 
redistribution are state contingent. where  TX  are taxes paid  to federal  government;  TR  are transfers  received  from 
federal government; and Y is GDP. It was found that the shock absorbing mechanism 
of  federal  taxes  and  transfers  operates  mainly  through  federal  taxes:  When  an 
average  region  suffers  from  an  unanticipated  one  dollar  decline  in  its  personal 
income, its federal taxes are reduced on average by  33 to 37 cents and the transfers 
received increase from one to eight cents. 
Von Hagen (1  992) and Bayoumi and Masson (1995), however, questioned the size 
of the estimated  shock-absorbing capacity  in  the  United  States by  distinguishing 
between stabilization and redistribution. 
Von Hagen (1992) regressed the growth of federal expenditure and  taxes (in per 
capita terms) on real  GSP  (Gross State Product) growth in  pooled  cross-section 
time-series data over the period  1981-86. It was found that the combined stabilizing 
effect of federal taxes and transfers is only  10 cents per  one dollar fall in  GSP; 8 
cents comes from lower tax payments and 2 cents from financial transfers. 
Bayoumi and Masson (1995) estimated the role of the redistribution in  the US and 
Canada using the following cross-section regression: 
where Y is per capita personal income, TX and  TR are per capita federal taxes and 
transfers; and i refers to state. The level of stabilization was measured using a time 
series  version  of  equation  above.  It  was  found  that  in  the  US  the  short-run 
stabilization effect of taxes, personal transfers and grants is 30 cents per one dollar 
and the redistributive flows from all federal sources amount 22 cents in the dollar. In 
Canada the redistribution flows are about twice as large as those in  the US  (39 
cents) but the stabilization flows are smaller (17 cents in the dollar). 
Soerensen et al. (1995) found that the income  smoothing provided by  the federal 
government in the US accounted for 14% of shocks to GSP. 
One problem with these estimates is that they all capture only the economic benefits 
that  accrue to the members in  centralized regime;  it  ignores, in  particular,  those 
effects of endogenous fiscal policy that result from the process that aggregates the 
preferences of diverse individuals. Next  section discusses some of these politico- 
economic  reasons  why  democratic  governments  might  not  choose  to join  in  a 
centralized risksharing arrangement between governments. 
5.1.2 Is Fiscal Federalism Possible in Europe? 
Centralization  in  large jurisdictions  with  a  social  planner  facilitates  risksharing: 
Redistributive schemes  transfer income from units (regions, countries, individuals) 
hit  by  positive  shocks  to  units  hit  by  negative  shocks.  Region-specific 
macroeconomic  shocks  are  considered here.  In this  context,  then,  two  or  more 
regions  may  be  able  to  share  country-specific  shocks  by  centralizing  their redistributive systems: when the region-specific shocks are not perfectly correlated a 
move towards centralized fiscal policy is indeed Pareto improvement. 
Alesina and Perotti  (1994) considered whether this implication holds in models in 
which the decisions on fiscal policy are reached by majority voting. Their one period 
model  consisted  of two  countries with  fiscal  policies that  redistribute  income  to 
different income classes via lump-sum transfers. Immobile individuals were divided 
into three income classes (A, B,  C)  characterized by  endowments of labor n,,  nb, nc 
respectively.  The  source  of  uncertainty  in  the  model  was  a  country-specific 
productivity  shock, which was assumed to affect all individuals alike in a country. 
However, the proportional income tax rate was decided by the majority voting after 
the shock occurred so that the endogeneity of the tax rate is an additional source of 
uncertainty. 
Under  the  assumptions  made  of  the  equilibrium  fiscal  policies,  the  following 
characterization  holds.  In  the  decentralized  regime  there  are  two  important 
characteristics  of the fiscal policy: on the one hand  there is no uncertainty  about 
policy (i.e. the tax rate is constant across all states of the world). On the other hand 
fiscal  policy  cannot  by  its very  nature  provide  insurance  against  country-specific 
shock.  In  the  centralized  regime  the tax  base  is  constant,  while  the  tax  rate  is 
stochastic (i.e. there is political uncertainty). 
Even though the centralized regime reduces the economic uncertainty it may increase 
the political uncertainty. Since the citizens of both countries vote on the same policy 
instrument, for any given shock there is more polarized income distribution over the 
population.  Thus highly polarized income leads to high uncertainty over the policy 
instrument in centralized regime and as a result  everybody may be worse off, and 
may therefore tip the balance in favor of decentralized regime. 
Alesina and Perotti calculated, under the assumption that individuals have a CRRA 
utility hnction over consumption, some numerical solutions to their model.  They 
showed that the majority  of individuals prefers  the centralized  regime because of 
lower political risk but the more polarized is the distribution  of income within the 
regime the greater is the incentive to choose decentralized fiscal policy. 
The basic intuition underlying insurance arrangements is closely related  to that  of 
public goods. An increase in the size of the country implies a trade-off between the 
common  good  (i.e. public  insurance offered  to the citizens  or simply  the public 
good) and the increase in heterogeneity (realized income or cultural diversity). Next 
section is devoted to this trade-off. 
5.1.2.1  Critical Trade-Off 
In their  analysis of country formations Alesina  and  Spolaore (1994)  studied  the 
trade-off between the benefits  of large countries and the cost of heterogeneity  in 
large populations. The cost of any non rival public good (i.e. insurance) decreases 
with the number of people who finance it. However, at the certain point economies 
of scale may come only at a 'political cost'. Authors assumed that the geographical distance  (i.e. realized  income  difference)  and  preference  distance  are  perfectly 
correlated that is if two immobile individuals are geographically far from each other 
they are also far in terms of preferences. 
In their model a 'government' (i.e. public insurance arrangement) is a nonrival public 
good. Each insurance scheme comes with a cost of k per unit of consumption. Every 
individual has the same, exogenous real income y, and pays a lump-sum tax ti. Thus 
the utility of individual i is: 
where g and  a  are  positive  parameters;  and  1;  is  the  preference  distance  from 
individual to his government (i.e. offered public insurance scheme). The parameter a 
measures the loss of utility which individual faces when the type of insurance offered 
is far from her preferred type. The parameter g measures the maximum utility from 
the  insurance  (public  good)  i.e. when  the  individual  i  "lives  next  door  to  the 
government"  (I, =  0). 
As far as the discussion on insurance is concerned the results can be summarized as 
follows: Socially  optimal number  and  size  of countries (i.e those that  the  social 
planner  chooses  to  optimize  the  trade-off  between  economies  of  scale  and 
population  diversity)  involves  compensating  individuals  who  are  far  from  the 
'government'.  The following tax transfer  scheme would  ensure the same utility to 
each citizen: 
where s* is the size of the country (s*=l/N* in which N* is the efficient number of 
nations). However, in  a democratic equilibrium in which unilateral secessions are 
permitted  and  a majority of citizens of each country has  decide upon its borders, 
countries are smaller and  more  numerous  than  a  social planner  would  optimally 
choose.  In  other words,  a  redistributive  arrangement  can  sustain  large  political 
jurisdictions, but it may prove practically impossible to implement such a scheme. 
The  second  result  concerns the relationship between  country  size  and  economic 
integration. To this end, the authors conclude that hrther economic integration and 
increasingly free trade will be accompanied by political separatism. 
Bolton and Roland (1995) focused on the secession by the means of majority voting 
in countries with different levels of income. Two regions A and B were considered. 
Total population and capital in region i are denoted by  L;  and Ki. Regional output is 
given  by  I:  = K!Li-8,  where  O<P<l.  Per  capita  regional  output  is  defined  as 
Y  yi=--  = k!.  Aggregate per capita outputSS  is denoted byy = laA  + lbyB 
L, Utility function of an individual is: 
where c,,  is private consumption and g is consumption of public good. Tax  rate on 
individual's income is t. Private and public consumption are: 
t ' 
where -  y is 'cost of public funds' and w, is the income of the individual. The utility 
2 
maximizing tax rate for an individual v with income w,  in the unified nation is 
Under this equilibrium tax, the median voter's utility is given by: 
Any  other agent with income w,  has the following utility under the median voter's 
most preferred tax rate: 
It is assumed  that  capital is perfectly mobile between regions while  labor is not. 
Under separatism the median voter in region i has the following payoff given the tax 
rate preferred by the median voter: 
where a is the efficiency loss  associated with  separation. Median  voter's  payoff 
under unifications6  is 
U(wmJ = wmi + -  (Y- Wm)[(Y -  w,,)  +  (w, -  w,)] 
2Y 
Hence the median voter in region i prefers separation to unification whenever 
56 Median voter in region i is not necessarily the same as the median voter in the &led  nation. 
66 If it assumed that  a<I (i.e. efficiency losses from separation) separation arises in 
equilibrium whenever: 
That is, separatism essentially arises whenever the income distributions are such that 
their medians differ. 
To  summarize  discussion  above:  The  process  of  European  integration  toward 
common fiscal policy may be endangered if there is greater divergence in income per 
capita in different member countries and also if there are great differences in income 
distribution across countries. 
5.1.3  Summary 
Evidence  suggests that  EU-wide  stabilization policy  acting  as  insurance  against 
regional-specific  shocks  may  be  desirable  although  insurance  against  income 
fluctuations is only partial and in the case of symmetric shock the insurance effect of 
federal fiscal policy  disappears. However,  a number  of problems concerning the 
design of such a scheme must be resolved. For instance the introduction of a federal 
system may  increase political uncertainty, open the doors for free riding in federal 
spending, and even moral hazard. A risksharing arrangement between countries can 
induce national governments to implement national  policies that  increase national 
risk  or that worsen the effects of national  shocks on the  economy  (Persson and 
Tabellini, 1992). Furthermore one of the most important problems is the so called 
democratic deficit: it seems that the public is less enthusiastic than political leaders of 
European integration. 
However, it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  Union  could  provide  insurance  against 
permanent  (series of negative) country-specific shocks without addressing directly 
the issue of income redistribution. At present the idea of large scale redistribution at 
the EU level is even less popular than the support for stabilization schemes. EU7s 
budget receipts were 1.1 percent of EU's aggregate GDP in 1992, compared to the 
typical  share  of  federal  government  expenditure  of  15-30  percent  in  most 
federations.  The  Structural  Funds  provide  grants  to  poorer  regions,  and  the 
Maastricht Treaty founded the Cohesion Fund to make monetary union easier for the 
poorer  regions.  It is  difficult to  say whether the implied  redistribution  of fbnds 
achieved  by  these  special  arrangements have  also  provided  increasingly  efficient 
insurance  against  bad  income  draws.  Needless  to  say,  no  such  evaluation  is 
attempted in this study. Instead, next section introduces more a efficient solution to 
the lack of the complete insurance market. 5.2 Shiller Solution 
Robert Shiller (1993) proposed in his book Macro Markets  a  new  class  of markets 
where claims  on  aggregate income and  service flows could  be  established. These 
markets would help people to insure themselves against longer-run macroeconomic 
risks that  really matter  to individuals. As  the discussion in  this far has concluded 
existing financial  markets  do not  provide instruments to manage  such risks. The 
Shiller solution would include markets for indices of national incomes, components 
and  aggregates of national income, and real estate. Because units have no control 
over these aggregate indices there is no moral hazard problem in insuring against the 
risks related to incomes. 
Appropriate hedging instruments and the total income risks are discussed first. Then 
hedging  the  risks  of  income  fluctuations in  other  areas  are  discussed,  since the 
relevant income aggregate for hedging purposes need not be confirmed to national 
boundaries. 
5.2.1 Market Design: Perpetual Claims 
The risk under consideration comes from fluctuations in  market present  values of 
long  streams  of  aggregate  income  flows.  The  notion  of  macro  markets  means 
hedging markets that allow hedging of the capital value of a stream of income, not 
the income itself, and, thus, markets that price capital values of those streams. 
Thus, instruments that  pay the holder each period an amount proportional  to an 
income measure (index) must be created. It is natural to create a market in perpetual 
claims, because prices of perpetual claims show no tendency to decline with time. 
Indeed, the if instrument is perpetual its price represents a claim on all future income 
payments and therefore represents the entire capital value of the cash flow. 
Perpetual  futures  markets  are  futures  markets  in  perpetual  claims  that  are  so 
constructed  as not to require any instrument promising to pay the income stream 
forever; thus no cash market is required. Indeed, future markets could be used  to 
create  perpetual  instruments  without  requiring  of  anyone  more  than  a  day's 
participation in the markets. Those with short positions would pay the income index 
to longs each day they are in the contract. Shorts would also have to pay a capital 
gain to longs, so that time periods are linked and the contract is effectively perpetual. 
With perpetual futures, there would be, every day, a cash settlement, total flow paid 
fiom shorts to longs; at time t the settlement st is given by: 
where$  andhi are perpetual futures pricei at days t and t-1 respectively so thatft-ft-I 
is the capital gain from t to t-I;  dt is the income index for day t (represents dividends 
on the perpetual claim); and r,l  is the return on an alternative asset between days t-1 
and t. There are two  interpretations of the  cash  settlement above: First,  in  contrast to 
conventional  futures  markets,  both  the  daily  resettlement  and  the  final  cash 
settlement may be regarded to occur every day. By this interpretation the term Gf, -5. 
1)  corresponds to the usual daily resettlement, and the term (dt - rrt.lft.l)  corresponds 
to the final cash settlement. By the second interpretation, the settlement St is just the 
excess return from t-1 to t between  an asset whose price  at time t-1 is 5-1 (pays 
dividend dr  at time t)  and an alternative asset that pays return rt.l between t-l and t. 
Rational Speculative Bubbles: Speculations might introduce some randomness in the 
price that is not related to the value of the item to be priced. Thus to keep perpetual 
futures price informative of the present value of the stream d,, some price limits may 
be needed. In order to avoid negative bubbles it is natural to prohibit negative prices. 
Futures prices could also be limited to some range around the dividend stream, so as 
to rule out infinite rational bubbles. 
Positions  in macro markets: The basic  intuition in  risksharing is that  the  losers 
(holders of short positions whose incomes increased) transfer wealth to the winners 
(those who hedged and whose income declined) in these markets. 
At  time  t  an  economic agent  (it  is  assumed  that  the  agent's  income  correlates 
perfectly with a macroeconomic aggregate represented by  the futures market) sells 
short one contract. At period t+l the unit receives r& + ft -$+I.  This provides the 
unit to the option to consume the amount rtft and investing the proceedsf; -$+I  in the 
asset that yields the return r. Next period t+2 the unit receives rt+&  +  ft+l -f,+z. Then 
it  can consume rt+&  and  reinvest the proceeds. Thus the unit  has exchanged its 
income for an income equal to the rate r times the value at time t of its claim  on 
future income. Thus  the fact that agents may want to exchange the income stream 
for some other has been neglected. There is reason to expect that an incentive to do 
so exists, since only short-side demand for macro market contracts is described 
For perpetual futures contracts the term backwardation means  a tendency for the 
settlement st to have positive mean if the alternative asset is the risk free rate, or to 
have a mean which is greater than minus the risk premium of the alternative asset if 
this alternative asset is risky. Thus backwardation is tendency for longs to earn a risk 
premium  over the risk free rate when invested in alternative asset and taken long 
position  in  the  perpetual  futures  market.  However,  the  average  unit  may  be 
unaffected by backwardation. If the average agent is long in the world macro futures 
market as much as it is short in its own market then premiums are offset. Although 
agents whose own income present value is a relatively high part of world uncertainty 
may  expect to see more backwardation in  their own market,  and  thus pay  a net 
positive insurance premium to reduce their income uncertainty. On other hand units 
whose income present value is a relatively low part of world uncertainty may  be 
expected to be beneficiaries of backwardation. 
If each agent who is short in a local futures market desires to be long in the world 
htures market, it might be advantageous to use the world  macro futures market 
return as the alternative asset return in  the settlement formula. Then each futures contract would be in effect a swap of the return on a specific claim on income for the 
return on a claim on world income. 
5.2.2 GDP Markets 
If  fbtures market  is  to prove  successfbl there must  be  enough  noise  in  price  to 
interest  traders  and  enough  uncertainty  to  concern  hedgers.  If  there  is  little 
uncertainty  of  fbture values  of  aggregate income , then  there  is  obviously  little 
incentive to hedge, and moreover, the price of the asset will not be very volatile. 
The standard deviations of these theoretical returns in  real gross domestic markets 
for perpetual claims was estimated over the period  1950-1990. Estimates are based 
on the time series data on real gross domestic products. 
For almost all industrialized countries under consideration the standard deviation of 
returns was at least a few percent a year (Austria 3.18, Denmark 3.56, Finland 3.43, 
Germany 4.39, Spain 6.60, Sweden 3.75, United Kingdom 1.14, United States 1.62). 
However,  even risks of this magnitude can,  if  not hedged,  accumulate into quite 
substantial variations in individual countries' incomes over the years. 
These results suggest then that there is indeed hndamental income uncertainty that 
could potentially be hedged and, hence, that such a GDP market seems to have an 
economic foundation. 
5.2.3 Other Important Markets 
Since national aggregates (i.e. national incomes, GDPs) do not in all cases provide 
one with best possible aggregates for hedging purposes global markets should also 
be  established for aggregate income flows associated with human  capital and with 
investments in human capital as well as real estate. 
5.2.3.1 Labor Income Markets 
Reich  (1992)  claimed  that  jobs  can  be  categorized  into  three  groups:  routine 
production services, in-person services, and  symbolic-analytic services. He fbrther 
argued that in  today's world economy one's job  category that determines income 
prospects  rather  than  one's  home  country. On  the  basis  of this  argument  labor 
income indices should be considered in hedging income flows rather than national 
income indices. 
As  noted  in  chapter  4  that  because  of  the  absence of  efficient  first  best  wage 
contracts observed wage rigidity in labor markets can at best be of the second best. 
Indeed, Fischer (1985) pointed out that existing contracts that require the firm to pay 
employees a constant real wage or income for a long time are suboptimal because 
the contract allows no  adjustment to market conditions. However, in general it is 
impossible for such labor contracts to a guarantee a given real income far into the 
fbture since the contracting firms simply may lack sufficient resources to sustain such 
a commitment. In  such  contracts adjustment to market  conditions typically  takes 
place through layoffs. It  should be noted that there aggregate labor income markets might provide some 
benefits beyond the riskmanagement fbnction. Business cycle theories, in particular, 
have emphasized the importance of rigidities, either in the form of information lags 
or  temporary  inflexibility  of  prices  and  wages  as  sources  of  macroeconomic 
fluctuations. Taylor (1  980) studied a stationary economy with staggered overlapping 
wage contracts and  rational expectations, in  which wage  contracts were the only 
source of rigidity.  It  was  found  that  staggered  wage  contracts of  one-year  (or 
longer) are capable of generating of persistence to macroeconomic fluctuations. 
However, if there were fbtures markets in labor incomes (as well  as in  aggregate 
incomes)  then  the incentive to  create rigid  contracts would  be  removed,  and  a 
hndamental alteration in the tendency for persistence in macroeconomic fluctuations 
might  occur. Workers could allow wages to fluctuate with the market and  hedge 
their risk against wage changes. 
5.2.3.2 Real Estate Markets 
In  2.2 it  was  pointed  out  that  most  individuals have  only  few  financial  assets. 
Portfolios of real  estate,  on  the  other  hand  tend  to be  highly  undiversified  and 
concentrated in small regions. In spite of this fact there is no liquid market to hedge 
aggregate real estate risk, and therefore the owners of the real estate are subject to 
substantial risks of local real estate price fluctuations. Fluctuations, which can wipe 
out lifetime savings, or on the other hand, generate massive gains. 
Uncertainty associated with real  estate prices  can, indeed, have  serious negative 
effects on the economic activity on the whole. However, all of these hazards on real 
estate incomes could be avoided if well hnctioning perpetual markets, based on the 
relevant real estate price indices, were available. There could  be  price indices for 
different categories of price and size for each area, so the owners of real estate could 
be insured against the drop in the index that correlates best with their property. 
5.2.4 Obstacles to Construct Macro Markets 
Existing aggregate income, earnings indices may not be ideal for the purpose of cash 
settling of macro market contracts. The problem is that these existing measures may 
not accurately represent the path through time of individual endowments (of labor, 
human  capital, etc.) that people want to hedge. The first  step in  the creation of 
macro markets is to develop, and make available, relevant indices. 
However, technical problems of constructing indices  can be  solved but there  are 
some psychological barriers to overcome. The most discouraging fact is that people 
do not routinely buy many riskmanagement products, and it, indeed, seems that the 
general  public  has  at  best  an  imperfect  understanding  of  risk  management.  In 
addition the general public does not properly understand hedging - it tends to view 
the participation in fbtures market as a form of gambling. 
Another obstacle is that under current institutional arrangements individuals are not 
permitted  to participate directly in  futures markets. However, this problem can be dealt by  using retailers who provide riskmanagement products to individuals,  and 
who hedge the implied aggregate risk in macro markets. 
Summary and Discussion: Macro markets as proposed by  Shiller are, indeed, a big 
step towards the  original idea  of establishing a complete set  of contingent claims 
and, hence, a big step towards more efficient markets for ri~ksharin~.~' 
The rigidities inherent in the insurance offered by  the federal fiscal policy  should be 
kept in mind. Stabilization policy of the traditional Keynesian type (i.e. automatically 
received  fiscal transfer component) constitutes second-best policy.  It  reduces the 
adjustment capacity of the economy because it contributes to making relative prices 
less flexible and production factors less mobile (Berthold, 1994). A first-best policy 
would directly reduce the incompleteness of goods and factor markets. 
Discussion  surrounding  the  fulfillment  of  the  EMU  criteria  has  put  forward 
arguments  that  the  most  serious fiscal  problems  are  high  tax-burdens  and  too 
generous social transfers. These arguments (whether they are fair or not ) really 
imply that the maintenance of local and  partial  insurance mechanism provided  by 
local taxes and transfers imposes too heavy costs on the economies and, hence, new 
insurance arrangements against income fluctuations are needed. The interesting point 
here is that the process of the European integration obviously  seems to limit  the 
ability  to use  existing insurance  systems (not  only  exchange rate  and  monetary 
policies  but  also national fiscal policies)  to hedge  against  country-specific macro 
shocks. However, the discussion on policy implications has mainly concentrated on 
the creation of new European-wide horizontallvertical 'political'  institutions but not 
on the creation of efficient risksharing markets. Well, then, how to create 'European- 
wide macro markets'? Shiller himself proposed that the development of new markets 
would  plausibly  take  place  in  two  stages.  First  users  of  markets  could  be 
professionals of financial markets who are already aware of the advantages and the 
use of available instruments. In second stage markets would be used by  the general 
public. However, in the first stage individuals should be able to buy insurance from 
private  insurance  companies,  who  act  as  a  retailers.  The  central  idea  in  the 
implementation of macro markets is that it is based on the private activity. The role 
of government is not necessarily needed and it is possibly restricted to supervision 
and development of system. 
In  addition  more  efficient  use  of  existing  riskmanagement  devices  should  be 
encouraged. For example, pension funds might alter their business to include some 
hedging of income risks from domestic fluctuations. This is possible in international 
stock markets because wealthy knds are able to reap  benefits  from international 
portfolio diversification efficiently. Haaparanta and  Sorjonen (1996) estimated the 
income benefits of portfolio diversification of Finnish pension funds. They concluded 
that  in  period  from  1987 to  1996, when  changes in  exchange rates  were  taken 
57 Capital account transactions contribute to the international consumption risksharing: individual 
countries are permitted to smooth their consumption over time by issuing claims to overcome 
transient shortfalls in domestic output or transient increases in domestic investment. account, diversification reduced the risk of portfolio returns about 40% and also the 
average monthly returns were higher than those of pure home portfolio. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this study consumption insurance and its various channels were studied. 
In chapter 2 a theoretical model of international consumption insurance was derived. 
If world  consumption risks are efficiently pooled  then the consumption of  agents 
should not respond to idiosyncratic income or wealth shocks and the growth in the 
discounted marginal utility of consumption is the same for all agents. 
The empirical implication of complete consumption insurance is that consumption 
correlations for any pair of individuals should be perfect. A review of the empirical 
research  on  consumption  insurance  was  given.  It  was  concluded  that  efficient 
pooling of consumption risks is not  the feature of the real world: Fluctuations in 
national consumptions are highly correlated with fluctuations in national production 
and not highly correlated with fluctuations in the world economy as a whole, which 
indeed  is  against the theory of efficient  international consumption insurance. This 
empirical observation suggested an analysis of the current market structure and  the 
extent  to  which  it  can  actually  offer  consumption  insurance.  A  number  of 
observations comes out of this analysis. 
Firstly, it  was found out that national  markets for financial capital are integrated 
which, however, seemed to be irrelevant for evaluating the degree of integration of 
national markets for physical  capital and  consumption patterns. The discussion  of 
saving-investment correlations confirmed that national boundaries are an important 
impediment to international net  capital  flows,  which  means  that  there  is  lack  of 
intertemporal trade between countries. 
Secondly, it was argued that imperfect consumption insurance among industrialized 
countries is in large measure likely to be the result of asset market incompleteness. 
Further analysis of portfolio  compositions of the industrialized countries revealed 
that there is a home bias in portfolios - that is many of the industrialized countries 
are not even nearly diversified to the extent that standard models of global portfolio 
choice  would  predict.  Although  it  is  quite  obvious  that  hrther  integration  of 
European capital markets is likely to provide some increase in  the degree to which 
private  capital markets offer  insurance against regional income fluctuations. This 
foreseen increase in insurance will most likely turn out to be  modest since today's 
stock markets facilitate direct hedging of only small part of the risks associated with 
national  income fluctuations (i.e. corporate earnings). Capital markets are, hence, 
incomplete in the sense that private agents are unable to hedge large fractions of 
their income against adverse shocks. If insurance cannot be  provided by  markets 
there could be a role for government intervention at least, at the level of individual 
country. 
Thirdly, however, it was noted that there are and there will be  several conditions, 
which will  constrain national stabilization policies. In a nutshell, EU countries will, partially because of the loss of power to use inflation tax, be unable to self-insure 
themselves if  financial markets do not  allow governments to borrow to the extent 
they do now, and if the deficit ceiling of 3 percent is exceeded after severe adverse 
shock. Also if the preliminary results that the growth in labor demand in Europe will 
be biased toward relatively high skilled workers turns out to be true there will be  an 
additional constraint on the taxing possibilities of local governments if they want to 
avoid fiscal competition and disadvantageous 'brain drain'. 
Fourthly,  labor  contracts and  labor  mobility  were studied  from the point  of view 
alternative insurance arrangements. It was concluded that the importance of real-life 
labor mobility as an insurance arrangement against temporary, short-run fluctuations 
is neglible and cannot constitute an economic proposition. It was also concluded that 
labor mobility is not an  efficient insurance arrangement in  large scale, although it 
might  well  be  a  welfare  improving  arrangement  against  agent-specific  shocks. 
Furthermore  there  are  several  problems  in  enforcement  and  formulating  wage 
contracts that could serve as risksharing contracts. 
These  observations  provided  the  grounds  for  the  discussion  of  the  policy 
implications of incomplete insurance market. A couple of issues should be noted. 
First, fiscal federalism was discussed from the view point of insurance arrangement, 
and other aspects of fiscal federalism were ignored. One of the foreseeable tasks of 
the fiscal system of a unified Europe is to provide consumption insurance to member 
countries.  Evidence  suggested  that  EU-wide  stabilization  policy  acting  as  an 
insurance against regional-specific shocks may be desirable. However, before Europe 
is ready for fiscal federalism the problem of democratic deficit must be solved. Also 
any  conceivable future common fiscal  policy  may  be  endangered if there are too 
large differences in per capita incomes across member countries and also if there are 
substantial differences in income distribution across member countries. 
Second,  the  policy  proposition  put  forward  concerned  opening  new  financial 
markets,  namely  macro  markets.  These  markets  would  help  people  to  insure 
themselves against longer-run macroeconomic risks that really matter to individuals. 
This solution would include markets for indices of national incomes, components and 
aggregates of national income, and real estate. It was also proposed that old financial 
market  institutions  should  be  more  concerned  with  hedging  consumers  from 
domestic  fluctuations  by  using  existing  insurance  arrangements more  efficiently. 
What is needed urgently is more serious research both on the creation of relevant 
indices for the use of macro markets and also research on the possible ways to create 
such markets. It would be also interesting to see at this stage in a theoretical context 
how  fiscal  federalism  and  macro  markets  would  optimally  interact  to  provide 
efficient insurance. 
The whole area of consumption insurance is quite new and all of its components are 
worth of hrther research. Especially models with alternative insurance markets (e.g. 
international trade, production factor flows and  so) and  models in which financial 
market  incompleteness raises  endogenously may  throw  light  on the international 
consumption correlations. Moreover, the knowledge of the theories and applications of consumption insurance 
will obviously give fruitfbl insights in to discussions of the welfare state. In the latest 
discussion  on the domain  of the European welfare  state it  is  often  claimed that 
unemployment, and as a consequence of this, social polarization is one of the biggest 
social  and  economic problem  that  today's  Europe is facing.  Indeed, the implied 
problem of growing inequality should stimulate debate concerning visions and ideas 
of new  social  contracts.  It  is  obvious that  well-trained  economists  familiar with 
risksharing  arrangements would  play an important role in  this discussion  together 
with sociologists and philosophers. REFERENCES 
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